

OCTOBER 1970

MONTHLY REVIEW

N INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST MAGAZINE

VOLUME 22

IS IMPERIALISM REALLY NECESSARY?

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LITERATURE AND REVOLUTION IN CUBA

ROBERTA SALPER

The Chinese Cultural Revolution

JEAN DAUBIER

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MONTHLY REVIEW: Published monthly except July and August, when bimonthly, and copyright © 1970, by Monthly Review, Inc. Second class postage paid at New York, N. Y.

EDITORIAL AND BUSINESS: USA: 116 West 14th Street, New York, N. Y. 10011.
Telephone: (212) 691-2555.

Europe: Frances Kelly, 9 King Edward Mansions, 629 Fulham Road, London, S.W. 6., Telephone: Renown 8824.
MR Edizione Italiana, Viale Mazzini 4, Roma 00195, Telephone: 383112.

Unsolicited manuscripts will not be returned unless accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope.

NEWSSTAND DISTRIBUTOR: B. De Boer, 188 High Street, Nutley, N. J.

SUBSCRIPTION PRICE: One year—\$7 in the U.S.; \$8 foreign.
By 1st class mail—U.S. \$12; elsewhere \$14.
By air mail—No. America \$14; So. America and Europe \$18;
Asia (Incl. USSR), Africa, Australia \$20.

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

As we go to press, we can report that in terms of dollar volume, response to the MR Associates appeal letter is running 7 percent above the comparable period last year. That is good, but not good enough. If you have been intending to join the Associates, please don't delay any longer, and make your contribution a little larger than last time, if you can.

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(Continued on inside back cover)

IS IMPERIALISM REALLY NECESSARY?

BY HARRY MAGDOFF

The following is the first part of a reply to a critical essay on Harry Magdoff's *The Age of Imperialism*. The second, and concluding, part will appear in the next issue of MR.

Both the essay (by S. M. Miller, Roy Bennett, and Cyril Alapatt) and the reply are appearing in the September/October issue of *Social Policy*. The original title of their essay was "Is Imperialism Really Necessary?" but it was finally published as "Does the U.S. Economy Require Imperialism?" In this reply we have retained the original title, and a few minor editorial changes have been introduced.—The Editors.

PART ONE

How a question is formulated usually defines the limits of its answer. Hence, a most important aspect of scientific inquiry is discovering the right questions to ask. In this context, the very formulation of the question about imperialism by S. M. Miller, Roy Bennett, and Cyril Alapatt takes us off the path of understanding modern imperialism.

Their article is directed to the question, "Is imperialism really necessary?" Imperialism, however, is so intertwined with the history and resulting structure of modern capitalist society—with its economics, politics, and ruling ideas—that this kind of question is in the same category as, for example, "Is it neces-

sary for the United States to keep Texas and New Mexico?" We could, after all, return these territories to the Mexican people and still maintain a high-production and high-standard-of-living economy. We could import the oil, mineral ores, and cattle from these territories and sell U.S. goods in exchange. Any temporary decline in our gross national product would surely be a small price to pay for social justice. And given our growth rate and supposed ability to regulate our economy, continued economic growth should soon make up any losses resulting from the return of stolen lands.

Or one might ask, "Is Manhattan necessary for the United States?" It would surely be equitable to return land obtained from the Indians in a sharp deal. Such a transfer might at first have some small downward economic effect, but eventually should make for more prosperity. Manufacturing on the island is an insignificant percentage of total U.S. output. The profitable port activity could be shifted to New Jersey or other excellent Atlantic ports. Other economic functions—stock and commodity exchanges, investment and commercial banks, headquarters of large corporations—could be transferred lock, stock, and barrel to the interior. Such a move to wipe out a terrible blot on the conscience of white America could be socially useful. Moreover, a new financial headquarters of the United States (and the capitalist world) could be designed to avoid slum, smog, pollution, and traffic crises; the demand for buildings, housing, and transportation and communication equipment in the new "Manhattan" might spur the economy to new heights.

Such questions might be useful in the classroom to help stimulate students' imagination and to illustrate the contradictions of a capitalist economy. But they will not contribute to an understanding of the role of territorial expansion in the evolution and functioning of the economy, or the unique role of a financial center in the operations of a capitalist economy.

Our Critics* no doubt justify their question on the grounds

* To avoid the awkwardness of listing the three authors at each reference, and to somewhat depersonalize the controversy, we will refer to them as the "Critics." We trust they will not take offense. "Critic," to our way of thinking, is an honorable designation.

that some popularizers on the Left formulate the issue purely in terms of "economic necessity"—as if every political and military action were in response to an immediate economic cause or to a telephone call from a corporation executive. Such a mechanical cause-effect approach is an obvious oversimplification, an inadequate guide to history, and more rhetoric than analysis. But when one merely meets an exaggerated rhetoric head on and makes the rhetoric the focus for debate, one departs from the tasks of scientific inquiry: one may thus be at a ball park, but not where the game is being played. The major task, in my opinion, for the study of imperialism is to discover and understand what Bernard Baruch described as "the essential one-ness of [U.S.] economic, political, and strategic interests."* In such a study, we have to seek the key roots—the mainsprings—of this "one-ness" as well as to understand the interactions and interdependence of the economic, political, and military drives.

It takes no deep perception to recognize the limits of the "necessity" formula. Thus, a substantial part of the world, notably the Soviet Union and China, has chosen the path of economic independence and therefore broken the trade and investment ties with the imperialist network. The advanced capitalist countries adjusted to these changes and have in recent decades achieved considerable prosperity and industrial advance. However, important as it is to recognize that such adjustments can take place, it is equally important to understand the route that these adjustments take: via wars, depressions, and huge armament programs. The economic adaptations emerged in the midst of recurrent struggles for control over spheres of influence—over other advanced countries as well as over Third World areas, it should be noted. And, most important, these adjustments have in no way lessened the intensity of the counter-revolutionary thrust of imperialist states, by wars and other means, directed (a) to preventing a further narrowing down of the territory in which they can freely trade and invest, and (b) to reconquering the space lost to the

* Foreword by Bernard Baruch to Samuel Lubell, *The Revolution in World Trade and American Economic Policy* (New York, 1955), p. xi.

imperialist world. Nor has this counter-revolutionary activity, which began during the first days of the Bolshevik Revolution, diminished since the United States took the reins as leader and organizer of the capitalist world.

The relevant question is not whether imperialism is necessary for the United States, but to discover the "rationality" of the historic process itself: why the United States and other leading capitalist nations have persistently and recurrently acted in an imperialist fashion for at least three quarters of a century.

The contrast between speculative hypotheses about the "necessity" of imperialism and the actual course of history is excellently demonstrated by the Critics themselves when they illustrate their interpretation of imperialism by referring to, and endorsing, the theoretical position of Karl Kautsky in his debate with Rosa Luxemburg. Kautsky argued, they point out, that imperialist expansion was sustained by only a small and powerful group of capitalists and that such expansion conflicted with the interests of the capitalist class as a whole. Because of this, Kautsky believed that the majority of the capitalist class would increase its opposition to, and eventually prevent, armed imperialist expansion.

It is strange indeed, in this day and age, to come across a revival of Kautsky's theory—a theory that has been devastatingly refuted by events. Our Critics refer to Kautsky's exposition at the 1907 Stuttgart Conference of the Second International. But only seven years later the First World War broke out, to be followed at the earliest practical opportunity by the Second World War. It doesn't take much insight to recognize the role that Germany's expansionist aims played in both wars: Kautsky's optimism turned out to be mere illusion.

The Critics remind us of the current dissatisfaction of some U.S. businessmen with the Vietnam War. That there are shrewd businessmen who recognize that at times one must cut one's losses should hardly come as a surprise. The surprise is that it has taken them so long to awaken to the reality of a lost war and its social and economic consequences. However, the acid test of Kautsky's and the Critics' position would be: how many of these businessmen would agree (1) to an im-

mediate pullout of U.S. forces from Vietnam, leaving the fate of Vietnam to the Vietnamese people, and (2) to a complete withdrawal of all U.S. military forces and equipment from all of Asia?

The major weakness of Kautsky's theory was precisely its concentration on "necessity." By casting his argument within this sterile framework, he distinguished between capitalists who "need" and those who "don't need" expansion. He thus ignored what was most important in explaining the course of militarism and imperialism: the industrial and financial structure of the economy, the strategic elements of change, and the special nature of the political system associated with successful monopoly capitalism. It should go without saying that a full explanation of, say, German imperialism would have to take into account the special socioeconomic features and history of Germany.)

On their part, the Critics in effect adopt for their own economic analysis the same limited and crude economic interpretation of imperialism that they are criticizing. Accordingly, they look at only some of the relevant economic elements; those that they examine are treated as isolates, not as part of a social and economic organism; and then they whittle down even these isolates. This shrinking process takes on the following forms: (1) They eliminate from the realm of imperialism U.S. economic activity *in other advanced capitalist nations*; (2) they restrict the field of economic penetration in underdeveloped countries to *exports and direct private investment*; and (3) *concerning foreign mineral resources*, they deal only with the so-called *national interest*, ignoring the drive for control over such resources by monopolistic interest groups.

Imperialism and Relations between Developed Countries

A large part of the Critics' article is devoted to statistical computations based on the assumption (and argument) that U.S. trade with, and investment in, other advanced capitalist nations have nothing to do with imperialism. Imperialism, they claim, concerns only the relations between advanced and underdeveloped countries.

This assumption misses an essential distinguishing feature of modern imperialism. The occupation and/or manipulation of a weaker by a stronger nation and the building of empires by powerful military states have occurred frequently in human history, in ancient, medieval, and modern times. Moreover, the birth and adolescence of capitalism were marked by military penetration of noncapitalist areas to bring the latter into the trade and investment sphere of the dominant capitalists.

Because empire-building has been prevalent over long stretches of history, the use of the term *imperialism* to cover all such activities leads to definitions that stress the superficial and avoid the essential. The value of distinguishing different periods of history, to which convenient labels are attached, is to provide a useful analytical framework for discovering and understanding the main operating levers of the particular stage under study. For that reason, it seems to us, the term *imperialism* is best used to designate the international practices and relations of the capitalist world during the distinct stage of mature capitalism that begins in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

But even if one disagrees with this terminological approach, it still has to be recognized that the international economics and politics of the past seventy to ninety years have certain unique features. Hence some historians follow the practice of calling the new stage *modern* or *new imperialism*, to distinguish it from that of mere empire-building. The rationale for this should become clearer if we spell out some of the major features of this new or modern imperialism:

(1) As noted above, capitalism from its earliest days sank its roots in the noncapitalist world. It prospered by adapting (through force and economic pressure) the rest of the world to fit the needs of the more advanced capitalist nations. However, it is in the stage of modern imperialism that its "historic task" is fulfilled: the entire globe is fitted into the world capitalist system (until, in more recent years, parts of this system break away). Prices of commodities produced around the world become dominated by one world price established in the major financial centers. In this period of modern imperialism, there is a sharp step-up in the international flow of com-

modities, men, and capital—in response primarily to pressures emanating from the most advanced centers of capitalism, including the pressures of competition among the advanced capitalist countries themselves.

(2) The resulting world capitalist system of modern imperialism comprehends an intricate and interdependent set of relations between countries at various stages of industrial development. The most striking aspect of this world system is the freezing of the so-called Third World countries as industrial and financial dependencies of key metropolitan centers—a dependency that is continuously reproduced by the normal behavior of capitalist markets. In addition, among the more advanced capitalist nations, there are a variety of relations of dependency of weaker nations on stronger ones.

(3) The technical underpinning of the modern international world economy is the growth of what Veblen called the “technology of physics and chemistry”: steel, electricity, oil refining, synthetic organic chemicals, internal combustion engines, etc. The technology of modern imperialism became the material base of decisive concentration of economic power in large industrial corporations and large financial institutions. The maturation of this economic concentration of power (called, for convenience, *monopoly capital*) affected the whole economic and political structure of advanced capitalist nations. On the economic side, in contrast with the earlier stage of competitive capitalism, economic change and economic policy are primarily determined by the imperatives of monopolistic-type industries (oligopolies, to be technical). The latter, to protect their assets and maintain their leading positions, are impelled to seek control over supplies of raw materials and over markets—wherever these raw materials and markets may exist. Furthermore, the evolution of an economic structure based on monopolistic firms limits the alternatives open to the political regimes of these countries. Governments, whether liberal or conservative, can operate with a successful economy only if they support, and help make more efficient, the major determinants of the economy: the monopolistic firms and the international financial arrangements with which these firms operate.

(4) Finally, a distinctive feature of the new imperialism

is the rise of intensive competitive struggle among advanced capitalist nations. It is this competitive struggle which helps determine the new world-economic arrangements and which is a major source of continual turbulence in the world capitalist system. Before the era of modern imperialism, Great Britain was the undisputed dominant nation in foreign trade, investment, and finance. The rise of industrialized nations, based on advanced technology that permitted economic and military competition with Britain, led to the hectic struggle for conquest of those parts of the globe not yet incorporated into the global capitalist arrangements. It also led to struggles for re-division of colonies and spheres of influence. But, it should be noted most especially, the competitive struggle is not restricted to dominance over the underdeveloped world. It also entails struggle for dominance and/or special influence over other advanced capitalist nations, as was seen in two world wars. Present also as a major element in the power struggle between nations and between monopolistic firms of these nations is the use of investment in one another's territories and/or cartel arrangements for the division of markets.

Thus, if one sees modern imperialism in historical perspective, it should be clear that there are two attributes of the power struggles of this period: (1) the struggle for economic power vis-à-vis other industrial nations, and (2) the struggle for economic power over the underdeveloped nations. Furthermore, to understand the imperialist drives since the Second World War, and the strategic alternatives confronting the decision-makers of U.S. foreign policy, one must take into account the past and potential rivalries of the industrialized nations. Not the least aspect of the latter is the maneuvering of U.S. government policy, and of U.S. firms, to take over trade and investment outlets of former allies (as well as former enemies) in the underdeveloped world.

Narrowing down imperialism to trade with, and investment in, the Third World thus eliminates a vital sector of international economic and political activity: the imperialist rivalries associated with the investment operations of advanced capitalist nations across one another's borders. In addition, the Critics do not face up to the reality of world economic

interdependence and the significance of U.S. international financial and military preeminence. The latter might be better appreciated if we focus on the balance of payments situation.

The United States has had a deficit in its balance of payments for all but one or two of the past twenty years, and that deficit shows no signs of disappearing. This is unique in capitalist history. Any other country—and the United States itself prior to its post-Second World War dominance—would have had to submit to the discipline of the international marketplace long, long before the twenty years were up. What would this discipline of the marketplace imply? Adoption by the U.S. government of such measures as would produce deflation: a sharp rise in unemployment and downward economic adjustment. Instead, the United States has been able to maintain its kind of prosperity through the 1950s and 1960s without undertaking effective measures to eliminate the international payments deficit. Quite the opposite: its prosperity was sustained by the very kind of activities which have generated the persistent deficit.

Why the deficit? As a rule, U.S. exports of goods and services (on current account) exceed imports. The deficit therefore arises because the U.S. government and investors spend in international markets over and above their “means.” The government spends huge sums for its military establishment around the globe, for its wars, and for military and economic assistance to other countries. Corporations spend on investment in foreign business undertakings—in advanced as well as underdeveloped countries. All of these activities, independently of the motives which induce them, contribute to the prosperity of the economy as it is constituted.

The nub of this whole development is that it is made possible by the fact that the other capitalist nations have, willingly and unwillingly, accepted the U.S. dollar as if it were as good as gold.

One need not follow too carefully the financial news to be aware that the other industrialized nations are not too happy about the necessity to accept the U.S. dollar as a substitute for gold; indeed, considerable friction has resulted, and still exists. Yet they do accept it, for several reasons. First, they

fear that if they rock the boat too much, all the central bankers will sink in a sea of financial difficulties. Second, they are impressed with U.S. economic strength, though this confidence is being increasingly shaken. Finally, and not the least of the considerations, is U.S. military might and its global presence. In fact, the United States has undertaken the major responsibility for maintaining the world imperialist system. It first supplied the armaments, armies, and Marshall Plan aid to prevent social revolution in Western Europe. It has furnished naval and air bases around the world, sufficient not only to encircle the Soviet Union and China but to act as a threat of military intervention or for actual intervention in the Third World.

Thus the United States provides the main military might for the "security" of the Western world, including Japan. The *quid pro quo* has been the reluctant acceptance of the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency, despite the inability of the United States to provide adequate gold coverage for its dollar debts. And one of the results of this *quid pro quo* is that U.S. business can keep on investing in Western Europe and buying up European firms, in effect paid for by credit extended by other advanced capitalist nations to the United States.

Suppose, however, one does not accept this analysis of the interrelationship between U.S. investment in advanced capitalist nations, on the one hand, and (1) the actual and incipient tensions between imperialist nations, and (2) the maintenance of control and "stability" in the Third World, on the other. Would the Critics then be correct in isolating U.S. investments in advanced countries as a thing apart from economic and political concern with the Third World? In our judgment, they would still be mistaken in such a narrowing down of imperialism. The reason is simple: when firms invest in advanced countries they become directly involved in the ties between those countries and "their" parts of the Third World. The larger U.S. investments in Europe and Japan become, the more extensively are U.S. interests bound up with the spheres of influence and neocolonial arrangements of *the entire capitalist world*.

The simplest and most direct illustration is the oil industry. Some 24 percent of U.S. direct private investment in Europe is in oil: oil refining, production of by-products, and the marketing of these products to Europeans and their foreign customers. But where do the U.S. subsidiaries get the oil to refine? From the Middle East, of course. Note especially that the rapid rise in U.S. oil investments in Europe was accompanied by a decisive change in U.S. ownership of nearby oil deposits: before the Second World War, U.S. firms controlled some 10 percent of Middle East oil reserves; by 1967, this percentage rose to 59. The success and prosperity of U.S. investment in the European oil industry depends on access to the oil extracted from Third World countries. Conversely, U.S. companies increase their profits on Middle Eastern oil by investing in oil refining and distribution in nearby Europe.

In less dramatic fashion, yet equally relevant, is the growing interest in the Third World entailed by other investments in the advanced nations. Thus, half of all U.S. direct investments in Europe and Japan is in manufacturing other than petroleum refining. Where do these firms get the raw materials to process? A significant portion comes from the Third World.

On top of this is the growing involvement of U.S. firms in the markets of the other advanced nations in the Third World. Manufacturers in the advanced countries have special positions and privileges in some of these markets through treaties and currency arrangements. Some of these preferred market outlets exist because of tariff barriers and distribution channels established in colonial days. U.S. firms thus extend their markets, getting a foothold in the preserves of other advanced countries, by investing in and thus becoming business "citizens" of the mother countries.

We have by no means exhausted the number of ways U.S. investment in advanced nations extends U.S. involvement in the economic affairs of the Third World. Let us look at just one other way. Quite recently, three U.S. banks made investments in England (a developed country, to be sure): Mellon National Bank and Trust Co. acquired a 25 percent stake in the Bank of London and South America Ltd. (BOLSA);

New York's First National City Bank obtained a 40 percent share of National & Grindlay's Bank Ltd.; and Chase Manhattan Bank acquired a 15 percent interest in Standard Bank Ltd. Note, however, that while all three of these U.S. bank affiliates are based in London, "their main operations are in broad chunks of the underdeveloped world. National & Grindlay's operates in India, Pakistan, and the Middle East, Standard is in Africa, and BOLSA concentrates on Latin America." (The data and the quotation are from the *American Banker*, January 28, 1970.)

Investment in Underdeveloped Countries

Having disposed of U.S. investment in advanced countries as unrelated to imperialism, the Critics train their guns on the relative smallness of U.S. business interests in underdeveloped countries. In the statistical process of estimating the degree of U.S. economic interests, they reduce the dimensions of this involvement by restricting the discussion to exports and direct private investment. Perhaps they do so because of the availability of export and investment data and the lack of other adequate data. Whatever the reason, this concentration on direct private investment and exports results in overlooking other major involvement. For example:

(1) Licenses of patents, processes, and trademarks granted to foreign manufacturers by U.S. manufacturing firms. This represents a growing business interest in the Third World as well as in advanced countries—in part a by-product of the worldwide distribution of U.S. movies, TV, and advertising. One finds, for example, such ordinary products as inks and paints manufactured in the Philippines under licenses from U.S. manufacturers.

(2) An important source of income to U.S. business is profit derived from shipping food and raw materials from the Third World to the United States, and the reciprocal trade. A considerable number of these ships are U.S. ships flying the flags of Liberia and Panama. Investments in such shipping companies are included in the Department of Commerce statistics under the category "International Shipping" and are ex-

cluded from statistics on direct private investments in underdeveloped countries. (Incidentally, control over shipping and related insurance required for Third-World trade are important elements of the dependency relation between the peripheral countries and the metropolitan centers.)

(3) Excluded from direct private investment statistics are such significant and expanding areas of economic involvement as: (a) direct loans by U.S. banks to foreign governments and businesses, (b) many types of foreign bonds floated in the United States, and (c) loans made in foreign countries by Edge Act corporations (subsidiaries of U.S. banks). It should also be noted that a favorite form of financing by Edge Act corporations is the convertible bond, a financial instrument whereby the U.S. banking corporation can convert the bond to shares of ownership in the foreign company if the latter proves profitable.

(4) The data on direct private investment do not include or measure the degree of diffusion of U.S. business interests in the economic life of underdeveloped countries. This is especially evident in the case of the operations of foreign branches of U.S. banks and foreign banks owned by U.S. banks. (This is over and above items referred to in the preceding paragraph.) For example, direct private investment in banks abroad shows up in the catchall category of "other investments," which takes in a wide variety of activities, including such investments as those in sugar and banana plantations. Thus, direct private investment in Latin America under the category "other investments" amounted to \$1,057 million in 1968. Since bank investments are only one component of this category, investments in banks as counted by the Department of Commerce would be considerably below \$1,057 million. But the assets of the branches of U.S. banks alone in that year amounted to \$1,736 million. And this does not include the extent of financial involvement of U.S. banks through (a) Edge Act corporations owned by U.S. banks, (b) finance companies owned by U.S. banks and other financial institutions, (c) assets controlled directly via equity holdings in Latin American banks, or (d) indirect control over Latin American financial assets through branches of Eu-

ropean banks, such as noted above in the case of the Mellon Bank stake in BOLSA. The financial assets controlled and influenced represent a diffusion of U.S. interests throughout the interstices of the Third World economies far beyond direct investments—in the day-to-day activities of the native firms as well as of other U.S. investors.

The importance of U.S. business interests in Latin America, for example, is indirectly reflected in the reason given for the partnership arrangement that Mellon National Bank made with BOLSA to enter the Latin American markets:

By 1961 it was becoming obvious to the bank's management . . . that because of its lack of international banking facilities Mellon's share of the domestic market was being threatened. Huge banks from New York, California, and Chicago were taking advantage of their international expertise to obtain larger shares of the domestic business of Mellon's traditional customers. (*American Banker*, January 28, 1970.)

In this we can see several important aspects of U.S. involvement in the underdeveloped world: (1) it is becoming increasingly important—important enough for banks to be able to win customers from each other based on the services they can give businesses operating abroad; (2) there is an interconnection of domestic and international business activities, one that exists in nonfinancial business too; and (3) competition within an industry spurs further penetration into the underdeveloped economies—also a factor in promoting pressure for investments other than banking in the Third World.

(*To be continued*)

For what is, in my opinion, central to the Marxian position is the capacity and willingness to look beyond the immediately observable facts and to see the tree of the future in the tiny shoots barely perceptible in the present. It is the combination of historical vision and the courage to be utopian—with the vision sternly disciplined by an analysis of *tendencies* discernible at the present time, and with the utopia rendered concrete by the identification of the *social forces* that may be expected to further its realization.

—Paul A. Baran

LITERATURE AND REVOLUTION IN CUBA

BY ROBERTA SALPER

In *Literature and National Life* Antonio Gramsci addresses himself to the question of revolutionary culture when he talks about the relationship among the "new art," "new artists," and "new culture": "To fight for a new art would mean to create new artists which is absurd, since they cannot be created artificially. One should speak of creating a new culture . . . a new way of *seeing* and *perceiving* reality and, consequently, of a world linked with 'possible' artists and 'possible' works of art."¹ In discussing the role of literature—and, in its broader sense, culture—in the Cuban Revolution, I want to underline Gramsci's words *creating a new culture* because this is what is going on in Cuba and is a primary means of understanding their new literature.

Theories of Revolution and Literature: Burke, Marcuse, Lukacs

After Trotsky's monumental investigation of *Literature and Revolution* in the early 1920s, various attempts have been made to define the relationship among the artist, individual consciousness, and social change, in both capitalist and socialist

Beginning January 1971, Roberta Salper will be Associate Professor of Humanities at Old Westbury College, State University of New York. The author wishes to thank Martha Salper for very important corrections in the form and content of this article.

1. Gramsci, *Literature and National Life*. The quote is my translation from the Spanish edition, *Literatura y vida nacional* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Lautaro, 1961), pp. 25-26.

countries.² I have selected Kenneth Burke, Herbert Marcuse, and George Lukacs because the first two deal with capitalist societies, and Lukacs examines the role of art under transitional and socialist conditions.

In 1941 Burke wrote "The Nature of Art under Capitalism,"³ in which he explains that spiritual or (by extension) esthetic values get their authority because they reinforce the ways of thinking and feeling by which man equips himself to accomplish the task indigenous to his environment; that is, moral systems grow out of practical needs (i.e., capitalism is said to emphasize the competitive aspects of work, and socialism the cooperative aspect). Burke distinguishes between *pure* art, which uses the values that arise out of a given social context and seeks to integrate and resolve its conflicts, and *propaganda*, which he says is educational, partially forensic, or suitable for public debate. Pure art reinforces established social patterns by allowing us to resolve esthetic trends or yearnings not resolvable in the practical sphere (i.e., Aristotle's catharsis; tragedy makes for a state of resignation). For Burke, *pure* art thus promotes the acceptance of the status quo, and *propaganda*, the other type of art he sees as essential to capitalism, provides an outlet to take care of those not content with, or those who see through, pure art.

In a certain way Burke foresaw what was to be a central issue with Herbert Marcuse, over twenty-five years later. In 1969 Marcuse published *An Essay on Liberation* where he talks about "the new sensibility." For Marcuse, like Burke, art is inseparable from politics. Marcuse is writing about America

2. A complete list would be too extensive to include here, so I'll simply name major works. Before Trotsky, G. V. Plekhanov's *Art and Social Life* and *Fundamental Problems of Marxism*, Marx and Engels, *Literature and Art*; then, G. Lukacs, *Studies in European Realism* and *The Historical Novel*, Christopher Caudwell, *Studies in a Dying Culture*, Mao Tse-tung, *On Literature and Art*, Jean-Paul Sartre, *What is Literature?*, Ernst Fischer, *Necessity of Art*, Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, *An Essay on Liberation*, *Negations*. Recently Jacques Ehrmann compiled an anthology, *Literature and Revolution* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), which includes many French structuralist writings but omits any mention of the Cuban situation.

3. In *The Philosophy of Literary Form* (New York: Vintage Books, 1941), pp. 271-279.

now, and the focus of his essay is on the nature of imagination: today, freedom of imagination is not only restrained by one's sensuous experiences—by sensibility—but also by the rational faculty of man, his reason. History influences both sensibility and reason because, as Marcuse says, "the world of the senses is an historical one, and reason is the conceptual mastery and interpretation of the historical world."⁴ Thus, our present history, the organization of this society, has not only shaped our sensibilities and reason but has also determined the freedom of the imagination. In other words, we are free to create ("imagine") only within the general framework of repression determined by, in the last instance, the order of society.

For Marcuse, political protests—demands for a change in social order—are, in our culture, partially the result of the ability of the imagination to break established frontiers and perceive new esthetic forms. Thus "the new sensibility" is in fact "the esthetic dimension [which] can serve as a sort of gauge for a free society."⁵ That is, a free society in Marcuse's terms demands a sensitivity free from the repressive satisfactions of the unfree societies; it needs a sensitivity receptive to forms and modes of reality which thus far have been suggested only by the esthetic imagination. This is the potential value of art such as surrealism,⁶ dada, science fiction, that of John Cage or Merce Cunningham—art that "blows your mind." Blows your mind: that means, allows you to see beyond the accepted norms of form and content. Imagination, thus freed, can entertain projects of new social morality and institutions. In short, we can almost say that Marcuse has developed a more complicated, more nuanced version of what Burke hinted at in his concept of propaganda art, and it is this type of art which can serve to liberate man's imagination to then create new and preferable realities and social orders.

In *The Meaning of Contemporary Realism* Lukacs dis-

4. Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 29.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

6. Marcuse discusses the historical importance of surrealism, as does Jacques Ehrmann in "On Articulation," in his *Literature and Revolution*, pp. 9-28.

tinguishes between "modernism," "critical realism," and "socialist realism." Talking about the relation between ideology and artistic creation, he says there is first a writer's conscious views about life and the problems of his time; and second, there is the understanding and portrayal of these things in his work. "Modernism," exemplified by, for example, Franz Kafka, has as its essential component the will to overcome *angst* and chaos. For Lukacs, Kafka is the classic example of the modern writer in a non-socialist society at the mercy of a blind and panic-stricken *angst*. He suffers the plight of "alienation," but since he does not trace the roots of his panic to the source that leads to political explanation and action, he feels powerless to do anything about it and, what is even more anguish-producing, does not believe anything *can* be done.

Critical and socialist realism differ in various ways. Firstly, the perspective of socialist realism is, of course, the struggle for socialism. Secondly, it is based not only on a concrete socialist perspective, but also on using this perspective to describe the force working towards socialism *from the inside* of a particular society, whereas even when a critical realist (such as Thomas Mann) attempts to describe socialism, it is bound to be a description *from the outside*.⁷

A third difference between critical and socialist realism deals with another aspect of this "inside/outside" question. Lukacs says socialist art is national art, and by that he means the way any nation reflects the particular historical conditions through which it has passed. As we will see subsequently, it may be what Cuban intellectuals such as Roberto Fernández Retamar and Ambrosio Fornet⁸ refer to as the development of a consciousness of a national culture: a pride in and portrayal of the heritage of one's nation rather than servile imitations of foreign models (the traditional attitude of Latin Americans

7. This "inside/outside" dialectic is noteworthy because it can be related to Fidel Castro's now famous speech of 1961 to Cuban intellectuals on artistic freedom. Castro said all criticism "within" the Revolution was permissible and none "without" it. I discuss this question at more length later on.

8. In his book of essays *En blanco y negro* (Havana: Instituto del Libro, 1967).

vis-à-vis French culture, and more recently, toward North America).

For Lukacs, critical realism is important in a newly created socialist nation because it can describe the reaction of the non-socialist to the new society and can depict many of its complexities.⁹ Fidel Castro addresses himself to this problem in his "Palabras a los intelectuales" ("Words to the Intellectuals") spoken in June, 1961. He speaks of the inevitability of an economic and social revolution producing a cultural revolution and of the need to redefine the concept of artistic liberty in Cuba. He talks precisely to "the artist or intellectual who does not have a revolutionary attitude toward life, but yet is an honest person."¹⁰ What does one do if he or she is in agreement with the economic and social principles of the Revolution, but not entirely with its philosophy? Castro answers:

"The Revolution has to understand this reality and therefore it must act in such a way that this sector of artists and intellectuals who are not true revolutionaries find a place to work and create within the Revolution, and so that their creative spirit, even when they aren't revolutionary writers or artists, may have the opportunity and liberty to express itself within the Revolution. This means that within the Revolution everything is permitted; against [or outside] it, nothing."¹¹

It is this "inside/outside" debate that constitutes one of the liveliest polemics in Cuba today. In addition to the search for an equitable and functional definition of censorship, a second preoccupation with the Cubans is that of developing and defining a new Cuban national consciousness. This is intricately involved with the creation of the "New Man" and is a basis

9. Although it is often difficult to draw a rigid line between the "socialist" and "non-socialist" in many cases in Cuba, and particularly with those writers who have chosen to remain on the island and yet have certain reservations about the Revolution, a parallel might be made between Lukacs's concept of the role of the "critical realist" and the part certain pundits of Cuban letters—men who were fully matured artists before 1959 and were and still are generally removed from the political scene such as José Lezama Lima—play in the actual cultural panorama.

10. "Palabras a los intelectuales," in *El Caimán Barbudo* (Havana, February, 1968), p. 16. (Translation mine.)

11. *Ibid.*, p. 18. (Translation mine.)

for the forging of a new culture as both Gramsci and Che Guevara have defined it.

But before probing these two questions in greater depth I think it would be useful to describe briefly the actual Cuban literary scene and its protagonists.

Four Generations of Writers in Productive Coexistence

Four generations of writers coexist productively in Cuba today: the Avant-Garde Generation, the Between-Revolutions Generation, the Revolutionary Generation, and the Post-Revolutionary Generation.¹² These are grouped according to age and interests of the writers and decisive historical events.

The Avant-Garde Generation appeared around 1925, coinciding with and linked to Julio Antonio Mella's founding of the Communist Party in the same year. Mella worked closely with intellectuals in university reform, and was part of the first generation of Marxists in Cuba who introduced Marx and Lenin as well as Gramsci and Lukacs into the country. Novelist and short-story writer Alejo Carpentier (born 1904) and poet Nicolás Guillén (born 1902) were leading figures, and the magazine *Revista de Avance* (published between 1927 and 1930) was their center. The magazine reflected the generation's preoccupation with Marxist thought and with Afro-Cuban culture. Beginning with José Martí, and since Cuba became a nation, a search to define "Cuban culture" has been going on; the search has always been involved with political struggle and with the relationship of the indigenous Afro-Cuban "subculture" to the rest of the country. One of the most instrumental figures in the fight for cultural self-determination was Fernando Ortiz, "father" of Afro-Cuban studies. Anthropologist, historian, writer, intellectual, professor, he remained in Cuba as Director of the Folklore Institute until his death several months ago, and was one of the men who influenced the broadest scope of

12. The nomenclature is not original; both Roberto Fernández Retamar in his previously cited "Hacia una intelectualidad revolucionaria" and José Manuel Caballero Bonald in his introduction to *Narrativa cubana de la revolución* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1968) use parts or all of it.

the country's intellectual life, both before and after the Revolution.

Another factor in the early formation of Cuban national consciousness was this first generation's close contact with the French Surrealists. Carpentier lived for years in Paris, knew André Breton, and he as well as painter Wilfredo Lam were influenced not only by the new freedom of imagination basic to the Surrealist movement, but also by the Europeans' "discovery" of Africa. Picasso's ennobling of the "noble savage" gave the Caribbean artists a new confidence and perspective with which to re-evaluate their own native *africanista* movement.

The second or Between-Revolutions Generation appeared around 1940, in part a result of the frustrations of the abortive Revolution of 1933 against Machado's dictatorship. The years of apparently unfruitful left-wing political activity resulted in a search for literary refuge in subjectivity and private sensibilities. The magazine *Orígenes* (published 1944-1956) was the rallying point for writers such as Virgilio Piñera, José Lezama Lima, and critics Cintio Vitier and José Rodríguez Feo. It set a new tone in Cuban intellectual life: diminishing interest in Afro-Cuban culture,¹³ nostalgia for a lost, harmonious past often coupled with a baroque release of imagination (Lezama Lima's *Paradiso* is a brilliant example), and attention to the grotesque and absurd, as in Piñera's stories, plays, and poems.

Today Lezama Lima, 57 years old, and a dean of twentieth-century letters, lives in the same apartment near Havana's ex-red light district where he has lived for 41 years. His high-ceilinged, small living room is overly stuffed with heavy Spanish furniture; on the greying walls are large, elaborately framed pictures of himself as a young lieutenant and his mother in her wedding gown; on a small marble-topped table is a leather-bound and gold-lettered copy of Flaubert's *Correspondance*;

13. Generational interest in the indigenous Afro-Cuban culture does not reappear until the Post-Revolutionary Generation where, as I will show, the difference in the political backgrounds between the First and Fourth (Post-Revolutionary) Generations gives rise to new functions and interpretations of the Afro-Cuban culture.

next to the *Correspondance* is a slim violet vase containing one pink wax rose. An ancient Spanish maid who emigrated from Galicia 45 years ago—hunch-backed, pale, subservient—hobbles off to the kitchen and Lezama, settled into a huge green velvet armchair, a corpulent presence emerging from the layers of the past, answers the questions I asked in August 1969: "What do I think of Fidel Castro? He has done one magnificent thing: he has done away with Cuba's corrupt, worthless past. The future? I am not sure what he will do with our future. Did I ever think of leaving Cuba? Of course not. I was born here; I have lived my life here, and I will die here."

The weight of historical and fictional past and an esthetic nostalgia for a kind of beauty incompatible with the realities of Cuba, 1969-1970, are also shared by Virgilio Piñera and critic José Rodríguez Feo (co-founder of *Orígenes* with Lezama Lima), but in a less exuberant, dramatic way. Rodríguez Feo, whose family once owned one of Cuba's largest sugar mills, now works in the National Union for Writers and Artists and is instrumental in introducing and translating foreign literature in Cuba. Piñera, perhaps the country's finest dramatist, does occasional French-Spanish translations for the Union and devotes the rest of his time to his plays, short stories, and poems. Both he and Rodríguez live in small, modest, Havana apartments that express an ease with a romantic and opulently exotic past and a hesitancy toward the present similar to that of Lezama Lima.

The third generation, the Generation of the Revolution, began and consolidated itself with the Revolution: i.e., on July 26, 1953 and on January 1, 1959. But unlike the first generation of the 1920s, intellectuals did not participate in the political struggle at the outset. And the reason was simple: most of them were abroad studying. In pre-revolutionary Cuba, as in much of Latin America today, sons and daughters of the upper-middle class went to European and North American schools. In terms of Cuban cultural consciousness, this resulted in a continual lack of national self-esteem, and a cultural snobbism vis-à-vis Europe and the States: the best way to be recognized in Cuba was to have first been hailed in a foreign country.

The "inside/outside" polemic is typically personified in three of this generation's leaders: Lisandro Otero, Heberto Padilla, and Edmundo Desnoes. All are sophisticated intellectuals with cosmopolitan education and are committed to remaining in Cuba. Lisandro Otero (born 1932) who now runs the Consejo de Cultura (Culture Council) and is a novelist (*La situación*, 1963; *Pasión de Urbino*, 1967), returned from Paris in 1956 and fought with the revolutionaries for three years. Heberto Padilla (born 1932) was closely associated with the revolutionary movements before 1959, and after Castro's triumph occupied important posts in the new government. Padilla became the object of worldwide controversy when, in 1968, his book of poems, *Fuera del juego* (Outside of the Game) was awarded the National Writers' Union prize by a committee of Cuban and internationally known personalities. After it was selected, the Culture Council objected to its "counter-revolutionary content." After heated public debate,¹⁴ the book was published (Fidel Castro emphasized the need to avoid mistakes committed by the Soviet Union regarding literary censorship) with a prologue explaining the government's attitude toward it. This position is summed up in the statement, "We believe our Revolution is stronger than any criticism, and we are demonstrating our confidence by publishing this book."¹⁵

Many Cubans say Padilla's personal and political conflict between conditioned middle-class desires and reactions and the revolutionary social reality has moved him (especially since the publication of *Fuera del juego*) to "criticize from outside." His critics accuse him of choosing an existentialist position in a society that does not by nature alienate him and of becoming a sort of Cuban Pasternak. Edmundo Desnoes (born 1930), on the other hand, although his *Memorias del subdesarrollo* is the story of the personal anguish a middle-class intellectual may undergo in revolutionary Cuba, is seen by supporters of the government as "constructive criticism from within," as valuable comments from a man dedicated to improving life in Cuba, as

14. The most important debate is that which took place between Otero and Padilla in the pages of *El Caimán Barbudo* in 1968.

15. See *Fuera del juego* (Havana: Unión, 1968), pp. 5-14.

opposed to Padilla's concern with "individualism" and "liberty" in a pre-revolutionary sense.¹⁶

The Padilla-Otero-Desnoes situation exemplifies clearly, as Caballero Bonald puts it, "the urgent need of the intellectual to find a guaranteed solution to his own contradictions, which depend both on his former bourgeois alienation and on his subsequent conflicts in the face of the demanding revolutionary experience."¹⁷

The fourth generation, the Post-Revolutionary Generation, is characterized by two different periods: an initial one of hectic publishing activity, and a more reflective, calmer time which Cuba is still going through.

The frantic period took place for several reasons: one, a profusion of works that could not be published previously—either because of revolutionary activity, or censorship from Batista's government—suddenly appeared, one after another, in an unending flood, as long as ink and paper held out; the second reason is that immediately after the triumph of the Revolution, many writers felt compelled to voice insistent denunciations of the immediate past, as if to reaffirm and guarantee the present: a type of exorcising, as Rodríguez Feo has expressed it. The organ for much of this literature during 1959-1961 was *Lunes de Revolución*, the literary supplement to the newspaper *Revolución*.

However, it was not until the frenzy of the first years following Castro's triumph subsided that a group of young writers (most of them born around 1940 or later) appeared, with goals, characteristics, and works markedly different from the previous generation and from many of the men and women who published in the initial 1959-1961 period.

16. Desnoes is a novelist, essayist, short-story writer, and editor who has lived both in the States and Europe. His *Memorias del subdesarrollo* is one of the few post-revolutionary novels published in the States (*Inconsolable Memories*, New York: New American Library, 1967). He also adapted the novel for the script of one of Cuba's most successful movies, of the same title. In an interview in Havana in August 1969, he said he was working on a book on socioeconomic problems of Cuba today, and on a novel dealing with the differences between capitalism and socialism.

17. Caballero Bonald, *Narrativa cubana de la revolución*, pp. 18-19. (Translation mine.)

Miguel Barnet, Nancy Morejón, and Rogelio Furé are typical of the Post-Revolutionary Generation. They are children of Che and are trying to find "an ideological and cultural mechanism . . . which will permit experimentation and clear out the weeds that shoot up so easily in the fertilized soil of state subsidization."¹⁸ These young people are primarily concerned with the creation of the New Man and the New Woman—the new cultural consciousness—and for this reason they are beginning their own investigation of Cuba's African heritage. They are seeking to clarify and define the present by a comprehensive understanding of the past, and particularly a part of the past that has been so little and so poorly explained. Furé's recent anthology of anonymous Afro-Cuban poetry¹⁹ or Barnet's "anthropological novels"²⁰ are revitalizations of the indigenous culture and part of the new and dominant self-pride of the Cubans, especially the youth. This type of stimulus to re-evaluate the African heritage is distinct from the Avant-Garde Generation's, typified then by Alejo Carpentier and Nicolás Guillén: in the 30s the interest was limited, in large part, to a few literary figures and it was a minority effort at self-assertion against an opposing dominant attitude.²¹

18. Ernesto Che Guevara, *Man and Socialism in Cuba* (Havana: Book Institute, 1967), p. 38. (Translation by Margarita Zimmermann.)

19. *Poesía anónima africana*. (Havana: Instituto del Libro, 1968). See also his prologue and translations in his *Poesía Yoruba*. (Havana: Ediciones el Puente, 1963). Nancy Morejón (b. 1944), like Furé, a black Cuban, is author of three books of poetry: *Richard trajo su flauta y otros argumentos* (1966) and the subsequent *Mutismos y amor* and *Ciudad atribulda*.

20. Barnet invented this term for a trilogy he is writing, each volume representing a segment of Cuban history. In a conversation in Havana in August 1969, he said: "It's sort of like Oscar Lewis's work but much better. The structure of my novels is more original; they are anthropological studies, historical testaments, and fiction all at once. The first volume deals with colonial Cuba, the second with the republican period, and the third will focus on revolutionary Cuba."

21. Carpentier is Cultural Attaché of the Cuban Embassy in Paris and Guillén is president of the Cuban National Writers' Union. The works of both men have evolved in response to the changes in Cuban politics in the last decade; cf., for example, Guillén's *Motivos de son* (Havana: 1930) and *Tengo* (Havana: 1964). A good comprehensive study of Guillén's trajectory is E. Martínez Estrada's *La poesía afro-cubana de Nicolás Guillén* (Havana: Unión, 1967).

Miguel Barnet is one of the most popular and widely read writers in New Cuba. He has published three tomes of poetry and two parts of a trilogy, *Cimarrón*²² (1967) and *Canción de Rachel* (Song of Rachel) (1969), in which he undertakes the search to define his national culture. *Cimarrón*, narrated in the first person by black slave Esteban Montejo, examines the historical role of the Spaniards in Cuba, their attitude towards the natives, racism, role of the church, and the sources for what up to 1959 was regarded as a "natural" scorn of the urban sectors of Cuba toward rural areas. As Montejo tells of his struggle for personal dignity in the nineteenth century, Barnet is careful to relate it to the continued Cuban struggle for mass human dignity in 1959. The simple structure, the direct limited vocabulary, and the subtly didactic tone are part of his deliberate effort to use the novel to educate people about Cuban history and the Revolution.

Canción de Rachel is set in Cuba's colonial period, and Barnet evokes that past in order to understand other facets of the present reality, clearly with a different aim than the nostalgic evocation of "something lost," typical of the second, Between-Revolutions Generation. The book has a more complicated structure than *Cimarrón*: a series of people give first-person narratives, and a continual movement among several periods in history allows Barnet to make his study-novel relevant to Cuba today. By introducing factual newspaper clippings, mirroring of regional linguistic peculiarities, and incorporating certain historical events, Barnet conveys the frantic, insecure, somewhat desperate tone typical of this epoch which, among other things, was the apogee of European influence in Cuba. Often it is Rachel herself (historically, a French woman who became a renowned cabaret singer in Cuba) who talks about the country's major problems: racism, oppression of women, religious superstition, poverty. For example, she somewhat woe-fully reminisces: "If I could have become an aviator, I would have loved to have done it; to hurl myself in a parachute from a height of fifteen thousand yards, to feel that emptiness and

22. Translated as *The Autobiography of a Runaway Slave, Esteban Montejo* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968).

then to touch the ground. That has been a dream I've never been able to fulfill. I know it's a mission for men, but it really attracts me."²³ Barnet, by implication, is referring to the advances in the status of women made by the Revolution.

Obviously this division of writers into four categories is subject to modifications and exceptions. "Members" of the first, second, and third generations live together with the youngest writers, and in that sense they are all part of the Post-Revolutionary Generation. I have simply used these categories as a convenient tool to give a panoramic view of various literary tendencies in Cuba today as well as some of their antecedents.

Literary activity is flourishing as never before in Cuba. In the last seven years more novels and short stories have been published than in the previous quarter of a century.²⁴ All books, and especially fiction, are sold out within days, often hours, of their delivery to bookstores. The Revolution not only eliminated illiteracy by teaching one third of its population to read, but also created an atmosphere, including the economic circumstances (government subsidies exist for artistic activity), in which "the likelihood that exceptional artists will arise is much greater because of the enlargement of the cultural field and the possibilities for expression."²⁵

Censorship; The Creation of a New Culture

At the beginning of his "Palabras a los intelectuales" Fidel Castro says that their economic and social revolution "has also inevitably to produce a cultural revolution in our country."²⁶ This, it seems to me, pinpoints the crucial difference between the effect of literature in Cuba and in the United States: Cuban culture exists in the framework of a revolutionary society, not in the framework of an incipient movement which has yet to win its first battle. Thus, the demands made on the politically committed artist in the States are very different from those

23. *Canción de Rachel* (Havana: Instituto del Libro, 1969) pp. 120-21. (Translation mine.)

24. Fornet, *En blanco y negro*, p. 94.

25. Guevara, *Socialism and Man in Cuba*, p. 41.

26. Castro, "Palabras a los intelectuales," p. 11.

made on a Cuban, who has the support and encouragement of the state.

Literature in Cuba, as in other nations, seeks to invite the reader to undergo a symbolic process of self-confrontation. It registers and arouses conflict and confirms and extends a sense of truth. In a revolutionary context it must also be an instrument of communication, which serves to raise political awareness and consciousness, as well as intensifying the commitment of the people to revolution. Historically, revolutionary art (particularly in the Soviet Union) has defined "realism-at-all-costs" as the best way to achieve this communication and political awareness. Although, in general, the products of Socialist Realism have left much to be desired—in fact, this approach binds and limits artistic experimentation and generally reduces the question of "culture" to an assimilation of the socialist present and the undangerous past—it is important to understand this "typically socialist" overreaction to form and style.

All artists are necessarily concerned with form; that is, how best to say what is said. But as intellectuals and writers steeped in the Western tradition, we have often used excessive concern with form as a means of not dealing directly with issues of content, of meaning—issues that involve making decisions and forming opinions about political systems and individuals. We are educated to believe that "objectivity" is the desired goal and that it may be achieved by perfect form, by elegantly expressing "both sides of every issue." This kind of "objectivity" implies that there is no "right" answer when, in fact, what it does is reinforce already established predominant interests.²⁷ As Marcuse points out:

With the concentration of economic and political power and

27. "All points of view can be heard: the Communist and the Fascist, the Left, the Right. . . . Moreover, in endlessly dragging debates over the media, the stupid opinion is treated with the same respect as the intelligent one, the misinformed may talk as long as the informed. . . . This pure toleration of sense and nonsense is justified by the democratic argument that nobody, neither group nor individual, is in possession of the truth and capable of defining what is wrong, good, and bad." Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," in *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969) p. 94.

the integration of opposites in a society which uses technology as an instrument of domination, effective dissent is blocked where it could freely emerge: in the formation of opinion, in information and communication, in speech and assembly. Under the rule of monopolistic media—themselves the mere instruments of economic and political power—a mentality is created for which right and wrong, true and false are predefined wherever they affect the vital interests of society.²⁸

Thus, when a magazine prints both a negative and positive report on the FBI, it fulfills honestly the requirements of objectivity: however, the chances are that the positive wins because the image of the institution is engraved in the mind of the people.²⁹ In esthetic terms, this ethic of objectivity or "benevolent neutrality" has meant an ability to absorb and neutralize even the most radical of formal experiments. Socialist Realism is an overreaction to this liberal tolerance and credo of "impartiality."

The Cubans are certainly aware of the shortcomings of Socialist Realism; and the stylistic virtuosity of highly esteemed writers such as Carpentier and Lezama Lima testifies to their maturity on this question. But they also believe a revolutionary artist loses his effectiveness in helping to build the new society when a concern with form stifles that which is to be communicated. In Cuba today the responsibilities of the writer are overwhelming because he, as a central element in the "culture," is shaping new attitudes and ideologies of the society.

In the United States the writer who wishes to use his skills for revolutionary ends has a difficult time because he must provide his own political direction; he does not exist within the framework of a radical society and is often isolated and harassed. He must face the problem that José Martí faced: how to deal with the psychological problems that the revolutionary artist encounters in a pre-revolutionary situation. In Cuba the necessary political framework exists, but not entirely without problems, such as the criteria for censorship. To be sure, Lisandro Otero's and the Culture Council's attack on Padilla's book

28. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

29. The example is Marcuse's. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

was censorship. But it was openly directed, clearer in intent, and less insidious than the more or less hidden censorship that permeates the free media in the States. Censorship in Cuba still serves to protect and preserve society, but it is not a repressive society, vitiating life instincts and isolating human beings from one another, from their political existence.

Art is functional in Cuba, intimately connected with a social process.³⁰ It does not need to concern itself with the kind of psychic liberation so much in evidence in the "cultural revolution" now going on in the States.³¹ The new writers are concerned with exorcising outmoded personal and political patterns of existence, with understanding their own revolutionary process, and with investigating alternatives for the society they are trying to build. These men and women are experimenting in criticism of all levels of the Cuban reality and in developing an authentic and universal literature. The unique circumstances that characterize the Cuban situation have not existed in any other revolutionary process in history; perhaps we are witnessing the appearance of a truly revolutionary literature reflecting, in Gramsci's words, "a new way of seeing and perceiving reality."

30. This is one reason why intellectuals and artists are sometimes required to work in factories or in the fields: so they will learn what needs to be communicated and to whom. This is an attempt to break down the traditional division between manual and cultural workers and to avoid writers' and intellectuals' becoming their own best audiences.

31. While a prerequisite for radical political action is a radical change in self (acquiring new ideas and feelings), a short-sighted over-emphasis on this kind of pre-economic and social "cultural revolution" may result in energy wasted in creating institutions to preserve "liberated psyches," while leaving the real engines of repression entirely intact.

THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

BY JEAN DAUBIER

This is the "Conclusion" to Jean Daubier's new book *Histoire de la révolution culturelle prolétarienne en Chine* (Maspero, 1970) and is published by permission. Jean Daubier worked in China from 1966 to the summer of 1968 as a translator. —The Editors.

Has the Proletarian Cultural Revolution attained its objectives? There are those abroad who say that it has ended in failure: they have the conviction or the impression that the upheavals that marked it have played such havoc, in the economic, social and political domains, that it has left the country considerably weakened. As I have tried to show, this is a profound error of judgment.

Was the Proletarian Cultural Revolution a complete success? This question can only be answered at several levels, distinguishing between the several goals of the Cultural Revolution. In the struggle between the Mao and the Liu factions, the latter was unquestionably defeated. Liu Shao-chi has been totally eliminated from all posts of responsibility, and he is held in the deepest disrepute. Some people point to the disorganization, the obstacles to economic development, and the resistance encountered by the Maoists as evidence of the high price they had to pay to get where they are today. In actual fact, I think I have shown that the disorganization, far from being an unanticipated mishap, was, on the contrary, considered from the beginning to be a normal, accepted risk, inevitable in a revolution.

Has the economy been seriously affected by these developments? Highly exaggerated statements on this question have

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been circulated abroad. That economic life has been slowed up and hampered is undeniable, as witness the restrictions on coal that we experienced in the winter of 1968. But from this fact we should not deduce crisis, stagnation, and scarcity. In two years of Cultural Revolution I was never able to find instances of shortages in markets or shops. These were, on the whole, regularly supplied, and all products were available. Rationing was never resorted to. Coal, supplied to individuals in reduced quantities in 1968, was an exception; the power supply remained normal, and interruptions of transport services were relatively few. Eyewitness accounts, which I was able to collect from foreigners living in cities as far apart as Shanghai, Harbin, Sian, Canton, and Tientsin, confirm these facts.

In view of the political turmoil and the prolonged factional conflicts, one might assume the existence of a solid opposition to Mao Tse-tung and substantial popular support for Liu Shao-chi, and hence conclude that Mao's victory is a tenuous one. It has been shown, I hope, that this is an illusory conception of things. The mechanism of the Proletarian Cultural Revolution was such that at no time were the ideological consensus and support for the Maoist regime called into question. In the conflicts between conservatives* and revolutionaries, no one mentioned Liu Shao-chi; on the contrary, everyone declared his loyalty to Mao Tse-tung, which allowed him to arbitrate with full moral authority. Moreover, the greatest upheavals did not arise from conflict between conservatives and Maoists but from a split among the latter. The summer of 1967 witnessed the culmination of this contradiction; the violent clashes and the subsequent danger of a split in the army could not be attributed to Liu Shao-chi's influence.

The disorders that occurred in China have been exaggerated abroad; whether deliberately or not, certain journalists and commentators chose to see nothing else. But these disturbances were not the principal aspect of the Cultural Revolu-

* In his glossary of Chinese political terms, Daubier defines a *conservative* as "an individual or group who, in the debates of the Cultural Revolution, showed a tendency to find justifications for the administrative personnel of his factory or his school, and for their methods of work which were being criticized." —Translator.

tion; far from it. Nonetheless, we must be careful not to minimize them. In effect, even if they were not as frequent or intense as alleged, they were real and, in the opinion of the promoters of the Cultural Revolution, they were necessary.

One of Mao's goals was to educate the younger generations by putting them through the revolutionary crucible. Those who had not known the old society ran the risk of growing up in ease and untested. By liberating energies and contradictory tendencies, by arousing many passionate, and sometimes violent, factional conflicts, the Cultural Revolution put millions of young Chinese through the harsh school of experience.

Was the goal of the Cultural Revolution achieved on this level? This is more difficult to evaluate but I think it was, though such an achievement scarcely lends itself to analysis. Undeniably the people have been deeply involved. Chinese urban society has been widely affected by the revolutionary effervescence; unquestionably the youth, in all milieus, was ready for action. But if they showed, at that time, a taste for physical confrontation, which must not have displeased Mao, they also revealed a tendency toward confusion and lack of discipline. Their organizing abilities appeared to be quite limited. The Cultural Revolution risked leaving to many Chinese a memory of an epoch of confrontation, of rebellion and very broad liberty. The regime that wishes to reconcile liberty and discipline, centralism and democracy, must then improve their political education.

The third goal set by the Cultural Revolution was to assure the supremacy of the Maoist ideology over revisionism. I have explained that this meant an enormous effort of politicization and ideological education, leading to the extirpation of individualism and the routing of traditional cultural and social influences. I have explained how, in the eyes of Mao, socialism—collectivist in its essence—is irreconcilable with individualism, the taste for personal possessions, the egocentric conception of the world. Hence the objective of remolding the mentality of men, of creating the total collectivist man.. Hence the equal need to combat the mores and customs of the past, which continued to influence the behavior of the Chinese people under the new regime.

In China's specific framework, this has led to a battle against Confucianism; we have seen one aspect of this in the criticisms of Liu's writings and of the superstitions, culture, and mores of the past, the mandarin state, and the *ancien régime* in general. However, it is perhaps here that the Cultural Revolution runs into certain obvious limits. The supremacy of proletarian ideology over bourgeois and feudal ideologies is now established. But a definitive victory is not yet possible. Maoism must continue to struggle against tradition, for it tends to survive in new and insidious forms.

Already one notes a certain formalism, which leads to struggle against tradition through means inherited from tradition: people assemble in the morning before work to read quotations from Mao; before each meeting they wish him a long life; scientific discoveries, cures effected by doctors, the feats of workers and soldiers are all attributed to his doctrine. It is not generally known abroad that Mao has often expressed disapproval of the excessive homage thus rendered to him.*

Some people claim that Maoism is a new religion. This is surely a schematic and superficial view. What we must understand is that what is wanted is a replacement of Confucian and Buddhist rites and maxims, which have impregnated the Chinese mind for millennia, by revolutionary maxims and mores. The force of a tradition that lies heavy on the consciousness of the masses, rooted in their habits, contributing to their conditioning, is being challenged by a superior force: that of the self-same masses, armed by the party of proletarian, revolutionary ideas. But to combat tradition with methods received from tradition would be to risk its survival through this subterfuge.

China is a country whose foreign political and military pressures, whose geography and historic heritage force it to live

* In 1967 Mao personally removed the reference to him as the "great educator, guide, commander-in-chief, and helmsman," in the communiqué announcing the explosion of the H-bomb. In 1968 he would not permit talk of "attributing absolute authority" to his thought. Recently he objected to the mass fabrication of insignia bearing his image, declaring that this would be a waste of metal, which is much more needed for other purposes.

turned in on itself. Can such a country, with its limited foreign intercourse and contacts, find within itself sufficient energy to destroy its own conditioning and create an entirely different one? To that question the Proletarian Cultural Revolution, victoriously carried out between 1965 and 1969, provides an affirmative answer. However, the problem cannot be considered definitively resolved, and the question will continue to be asked for several decades.

There are many reasons to hope that Mao's proletarian revolutionary ideal will be able to avoid submersion in that sea of feudalism and idealism which is Chinese tradition. But for this to happen, many tests will be necessary. Now we can understand what Mao said in 1967:

The present Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is only the first of its kind. In the future such revolutions must take place. . . . All Party members and the population at large must guard against believing . . . that everything will be fine after one, two, three, or four cultural revolutions. We must pay close attention and we must not relax our vigilance.

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BOOKS

KOLKO ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

By Harold Baron

The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 by Gabriel Kolko. New York: Random House, 1968. 685 pp.,

The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose by Gabriel Kolko. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969. 166 pp., \$5.95.

Today more than ever before it is imperative to view American world involvement in terms of its imperialist essence rather than its tactical accidents. Toward this end Gabriel Kolko's massive study, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, provides a reassessment of American policy which simultaneously combats both the abstract power concepts of the *realpolitik* theorists who have dominated the scene for the last two decades, and the limitations of a nostalgic analysis that looks back to the unique conditions of anti-fascist strategy in the Roosevelt era. With a truly sweeping review of the literature and careful documentation, this book sets wartime diplomacy within the framework of the longer-range developments of modern imperialism. The anti-Nazi alliance with the Soviet Union, then the only socialist nation in the world, is characterized as a military exigency, not the charting of a new global policy for American capitalism.

The underlying strategy of the United States as an imperial power, in Kolko's interpretation, was that of an international open-door expansionism. Twentieth-century American strategists

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worked to remove in all the nations and colonies of the world barriers to U.S. trade and investment. Although much was made of the supposed equality of this open system, in which direct political control was a secondary factor, the size of the American industrial plant, plus its technical and organizational advantages, would assure a preferred position to this nation's corporations. This global program was analogous to the free-trade policies of world-dominant British capitalism during the nineteenth century. In both cases the industrial giant sought to impose a set of rules for international economic affairs which, despite the appearance of impartiality, allowed the big guy to win most often. In line with this thesis, Woodrow Wilson and Cordell Hull become for Kolko the great architects of modern American foreign policy.

Regarding political goals, there were often internal disagreements in American ruling circles. For one thing, the actual course of the war brought about certain unforeseeable conditions. Therefore, until the Red Army had broken the back of the *Wehrmacht* at Stalingrad, the allies were in a kind of state of defensive huddling together. "To the Russians it appeared that the West made politics while Russia made war." (p. 30) Only with the prospects of victory that emerged in 1943 did serious diplomacy develop. The British, operating according to well-established principles of power politics, followed a policy of conducting the war and the diplomatic controversies in such a way as to protect their hegemony over the Empire, the sterling bloc, and certain long-established trading partners. Churchill sought to forestall the Soviet Union wherever he could. Where he could not, he was willing to make a deal. The Americans' policy was not as decisive. Whereas they were more willing to give the Soviets military relief through a second front in France, they were not willing to grant the USSR or the Left anything politically during the course of the war. Instead, the U.S. leadership chose wherever possible to restore status quo regimes on a caretaker basis and leave any definite settlements for future peace negotiations. Obviously the expectation was that the American bargaining position would be greatly improved by the end of the war when its allies' resources would be exhausted while its own population and physical plant would still be intact. The United States would then clearly be the world power possessing all the advantages for imposing a political settlement consistent with its expansionist objectives.

No such lack of definition existed with regard to economic policy. From the Atlantic Charter that was issued even before

America entered the war to the founding of the United Nations, although the language was abstract and noble, there was consistency and clarity as to the underlying type of world-wide economic conditions that were being sought. The goal was to establish a world market in which there would be no significant restrictions on U.S. firms through trade bloc arrangements and closed national markets either in terms of investment opportunities or imports and exports. International monetary and financial arrangements were to be so structured as to give advantage and aid to American business.* Temporary support would bolster up faltering capitalist nations that had been hurt by the war. They were to be restored to the point where they could enter into viable market relations with American capitalists. Aid would go no further. Under the banner of economic liberalism the United States sought to reconstitute a world capitalist order in which American business, by virtue of its large share of the market, would have a preferred—as it were, oligopolist—position.

With this understanding, we can see that while the world freedoms that were publicly proclaimed as the objectives of American policy had an abstract appeal to many diverse persons, they had an imperial essence. The American championing of the construction of a free world market had one unstated precondition—that of the superiority of its own power and property—which made the goals universal in form and expansionist in content. Political and economic strategies were analogous in that they both sought to avoid specific commitments until a situation was established in which the might of the industrial Goliath would be decisive in claiming privilege under a set of conditions that had the appearance of ensuring the neutral rule of law.

While there was basic unanimity in Washington regarding the economic strategy, a division existed between those who sought to insure a dominant world position through a great-power alliance and those who would do the same through the more universalistic form of an inclusive international body. Roosevelt was the most willing to work along the lines of a Churchill-style conception of great-power relationships. Cordell Hull, the main proponent of open-door expansionism, favored a general international organization to achieve his ends. These differences were compromised through the structuring of the United Nations:

* A goal that has been successfully accomplished. As a former Director of the International Monetary Fund told me, "We now do by administrative regulation what it used to take the U.S. marines to do."

The United Nations was born without illusions and without sacrifices on the part of the United States. The new organization failed before it began, for Washington conceived it with exceptions and loopholes, in an atmosphere of suspicion and manipulation, not as a forum for agreement, but as an instrument in the Great Power conflict. . . . Moving behind the internationalist rhetoric of the new structure it fully expected to control, the United States hoped to define the basic thrust of postwar world politics in a fashion compatible with its national interests. (p. 483)

In terms of the inclusive aspects of the United Nations, the United States worked out a position that did not imperil its regional arrangements and dominance in the Western Hemisphere—in fact the Latin American bloc was to provide the base for control of voting in the General Assembly. Regarding the Security Council, American strength was bolstered by making its Chinese puppet, the Chiang government, one of the permanent members with a veto power so that two of the five votes were in Uncle Sam's pocket.

This reliance on Chiang's Kuomintang as a keystone in global strategy limited U.S. China policy by committing it to the resuscitation of a gangster ruling clique that had dissipated any meaningful base it once had in Chinese society. Ironically this policy aided the Chinese Communist revolution by accelerating the breakup of the old society and making impossible the stabilization of a viable bourgeois-oriented government à la India. The latter alternative was the objective that the old China hands in the State Department had in mind, but Chiang was able to shunt them aside by demanding unconditional support as the price of his puppet role on the international scene. Eventually the American diplomats' efforts to prevent a total disaster for American capitalism in China were to be repaid by accusations of treasonous behavior and Joe McCarthy's hounding them out of the Foreign Service.

Kolko's trenchant analysis of the strategy vis-à-vis China does not conform to his generalizations about leaving big decisions until later, but it does provide an indication of much that was in store for regions of the world where national liberation movements threatened to gain power. With regard to the Kuomintang, the political commitments were made definite and early. The purpose of economic aid was not primarily to create favorable conditions for the operation of U.S. corporations but was basically a political payoff to sustain a client state.

American global strategy operated on the assumption that

the old world order would not be substantially transformed. It was just to be reshuffled in a manner that would allow the United States to curb potential rivals. Not only was dominance to be asserted vis-à-vis the Soviet Union but the policy also dictated that Great Britain was to be firmly shoved into a junior partner role in the capitalist world. The assumption of basic continuity in the socio-economic arrangements around the world led to no anticipation of the total collapse of the old society in Eastern Europe, the invigoration of the Left in Western Europe, or the upsurge of anti-colonial movements around the world. One can expect that the interpretation in Kolko's promised next volume will show that American policy-makers invented a *deus ex machina* of Soviet conspiracy and aggressiveness to explain the failure of world history to materialize according to their assumptions.

In actuality, Stalin and the Soviets followed a very non-expansionist policy wherein changes in the internal life of any other country were clearly subordinated to the number one priority of ending the war and providing some breathing space for the reconstruction of their devastated land. Friendly, not by any necessity socialist, neighbors were of course required for this purpose. Beyond that, "Stalin played a conservative game at Yalta just as the Communist parties were then attempting to do throughout Europe. He was prepared naively to grant more to Western interests than he asked in return." (p. 368)

Because the disruption of the war had caused the old order to collapse so completely, the sweeping changes that took place in the domestic life of the East European nations came as somewhat of a surprise even to the Soviets. As the case of Yugoslavia showed, they were not expecting socialist revolutions and would make efforts to curb their independence. As the case of Finland showed, they were prepared to live with a bourgeois-oriented neighbor as long as it was friendly. Yet, when the United States found out that it could not impose its political and economic program on the East European countries, it could not conceive of any viable basis for relating to these nations.

In Italy the British and the Americans were the ones to establish precedents for unilateral control of occupied territory. Characteristically, the United States tried unsuccessfully to restore the political authority of the monarchy and the reactionary army leadership. The Soviet Union, since its armies were not involved in the taking of Italy, was frozen out from any effective influence in the occupation authority. When the Red Army swept over

Rumania, the USSR just followed the Italian precedent and assumed control, leaving its allies in a minor advisory position. In Greece, the British, with American aid, wiped out the national resistance forces and largely re-established the power of those who had collaborated with the Nazis. The ruthlessness in Greece far exceeded anything the Soviets have done in East Europe.

In Europe the United States and Great Britain operated as an alliance within an alliance, working out agreements on strategy before dealing with the Soviet Union. The commonality of interest in maintaining a strong capitalist order and limiting socialist influence in Europe dictated such a course of action. In the East, however, America in effect kept its own counsel in what appeared as a struggle for empire and economic influence. The British were edged out of their dominant position in the Middle Eastern oil picture. The Kuomintang government in China was purchased as an American client. Regarding Japan, Washington developed a strategy that required the mass of the Japanese army to be engaged on the Asian mainland by some combination of the Kuomintang, the Chinese Communists, and the Soviet army. In a naval and air war the United States would then defeat Japan and be very careful to keep the British from any important participation in the naval activity. Therefore, when the Americans set up an occupation authority on the Japanese islands they could apply the Italian precedent of excluding their allies from power vis-à-vis both the Soviets and the British.

The Politics of War, undoubtedly one of the decade's most important books on American history, provides new depth and coherence to the welter of events in which the United States has executed its imperial policy. Unfortunately, however, this larger work on wartime diplomacy will generally be useful only to the serious student since it assumes an overall knowledge of the period, includes a vast amount of detail, and is presented in a literary style that often is very difficult. The shorter book under review, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy*, presents a number of essays through which the reader can grasp some of Kolko's main theses in a reasonable amount of time. One wishes that the author had included an essay that summarized his thinking on American diplomacy during the Second World War so that his very pregnant work would be readily accessible to an audience other than the expert.

As in the case of the larger book, Kolko's great strength lies in his ability to overcome the obscurities of both politician and

academic by fusing a wide range of information into a coherent pattern of development. His essay on "The United States in Vietnam, 1944-1966" is the most significant in this regard. The consistency and continuity of a policy frustrating the national liberation movement over this entire time span are convincingly laid out. This is a challenge to the near-sighted rationales of liberal-minded opponents of the war who avoid taking any further step toward becoming opponents of American imperialism by depicting American involvement in Vietnam as a miscalculation or an aberration.

Two essays in *The Roots of American Foreign Policy* deal with the control of the corporate elite over decision-making processes in foreign affairs and military strategy. Men who are at once economic and political leaders have concentrated in their hands the setting of assumptions, the definition of goals, and the execution of key policies. While Kolko presents a telling argument that the military elite is dependent upon and deferent to the business-dominated civilian authorities, he does not demolish the idea of a military-industrial complex. He fails to deal with the fact that a large number of major corporations have become either specialized to, or greatly dependent upon, military expenditures for markets. Decisions might be made for militaristic purposes even though those who make them are not members of the military. The argument as to which elite makes the key decisions on strategy does not deal with the militarization of a large sector of American capitalism.

Kolko's analysis is not as strong when it tries to develop a model of the dynamics determining the development of those large processes which he sees so clearly. For a more powerful and strategically useful model he would need a more elaborate theory of the American state and the American capitalist class as a class. Although he talks in terms of a class analysis, when he gets down to business, he frequently substitutes an elite concept for a class concept. Thus *The Politics of War* and the essay on "The United States and World Economic Powers" at times tend to reduce explanation to a determinist model in which particular economic interests appear adequate to account for major features of global policy. More specifically, the author seems to have a bug on explaining in terms of a desire to secure the supply of raw materials.

Under the category "economic objective," Kolko in both books fails to make sufficient distinction between (1) immediate economic interests, which are usually those of a small number of firms, (2) rules of the game, e.g., world monetary arrangements

or trade regulations (in which any specific set of economic regulations might be more or less favorable to a particular nation's business), and (3) basic class interests in which the whole range of political and social arrangements operates so as to sustain certain forms of property and labor relations. In terms of larger strategies, the first two usages are necessary but not always sufficient to provide an adequate understanding of state policy. While by themselves they certainly provide a more satisfactory explanation than the empty "national interest" theories that abound in the establishment literature, it is necessary to push beyond them and make *class* the fundamental category of analysis. The projection of a class-oriented strategy has as its basic purpose the creation or the preservation of a set of conditions under which a type of economic interests, i.e., the dominant form of capitalism in the nation, can flourish. Often the fulfillment of this purpose requires that particular interests be compromised or negated or that the beneficiaries of the system be taxed in order to sustain its underlying conditions of operation. Most likely Kolko would be in general agreement with this position. The point is that his analysis does not always conform to it.

The internal dynamics of modern American imperialism have largely taken shape as an interplay between particular interests and the visions of political leadership as to the type of world conditions that would be most advantageous to U.S. business on a long-range basis. Projections of class interest at times have outdistanced particular economic advantages. Secretary of State James G. Blaine's dream in the 1880s of the rule of a Pax Americana in the Western Hemisphere went beyond the then current ambitions of American businessmen. And today the rape of Vietnam is being pressed to maintain the dependency of the Third World. Any calculation of direct economic gain is of secondary significance, for, as Kolko himself points out, the U.S. campaign in Vietnam is ultimately part of a global strategy of counter-revolution. Those American firms feasting off of Vietnam are vultures eating the carrion left by the American eagle.

At other times the objectives of American diplomacy have been narrowly focused on the immediate advantage of specific corporations, as has often been the case in the world politics of oil. An adequate theory must provide for the fusion of the programmatic and the particular without reducing one to being a mechanistic function of the other.

If Kolko's conceptualizations for explaining American policy

are marred by mechanistic biases, his portrayal of the dynamics of Soviet action is at times confused by the employment of moralistic categories. There is a tendency to depict wartime Soviet policy as selling out the revolution in other countries by its placing exclusive priority on defending the nation in which a socialist revolution had taken place. The USSR and the Communist parties whose policies were so concerned with its military defense are depicted as unjustifiably putting a brake on the Left movements in the various nations, so as not to slow down the war effort by creating friction between the USSR and its bourgeois allies. At the same time it is acknowledged that if the Left resistance movements in Italy or France had seriously contended for power, they would have been crushed by the American and British armies—as indeed the Greek resistance was. The Soviets, even if they had wanted to, would not have had the resources to give them aid. Nevertheless, Kolko implies that by seeking to spare the Soviet Union a further strain on its already exhausted resources, the Communists around the world were being counter-revolutionaries. Yet, even the Chinese Communists under Mao, who were conducting armed struggle and were the most independent of Soviet influence, projected their immediate postwar strategy on the basis of a domestic united front and international co-operation.

Many Western left intellectuals make a grave mistake if they construe the USSR's options as having been in the same ballpark as those of the United States or even of Great Britain. During the war the major part of the Nazi armies was engaged in Russia. The survival of the Soviet state was literally in question. At the termination of the war a nation that had lost 20 million people and half of its industrial plant was not in much of a position to give aid elsewhere. The Russians had neither time nor resources to gamble on some high-risk leftism in liberated countries. In placing such an overwhelming emphasis on victory, a basically correct assessment of priorities was made by the Communist parties. The survival of the Soviet Union has meant much for the world revolutions, as Kolko admits: "The impact of these changes [the colonial revolutions] on the conditions and structure of world power were to be more far-reaching than the Bolshevik Revolution itself, in part because—after 1947—the protective existence and support of Soviet power was a cushion between success and failure in many, but by no means all, socialist or revolutionary nations." (*The Politics of War*, p. 621)

As we well know today, both in the case of nations and

parties, there is a very real danger of revolutionary ardor going stale when a movement can no longer think beyond the gains it has already made. But there is also a kind of adventurism that would fritter these gains away rather than accept the complex task of preserving and building upon them.) There are major contradictions in the conduct of a revolution—between the survival of the nation in which it takes place and the transforming of both the domestic and world system that it is seeking to overthrow, between the development of strong social instruments to carry out the transformation and the necessity to overcome stagnation generated by the institutional maintenance and needs of these instruments. The development of revolutionary strategy involves the confrontation of these objective dilemmas rather than puristically hanging on to only one side of the dilemma. Political engagement involves dealing with contradiction, and at times ambiguity. Unfortunately, strategic alternatives do not come in neat logical categories; it is therefore unrealistic to operate with a moralistic absolute about supporting every revolutionary urge everywhere that it may present itself and regardless of conditions.

Professor Kolko's re-examination of modern American diplomacy provides a solid step forward in socialist scholarship. He has asked most of the important questions in a radical form that forces us to seek answers in terms of basic political processes. His questions imply political strategies, not just more analysis.

TEACHING AND LEARNING IN CITY SCHOOLS

By Annette T. Rubinstein

Teaching and Learning in City Schools by Eleanor Burke Leacock.
New York: Basic Books, 1969; \$7.50.

Debs once remarked that to call voting for socialism socialist was like calling a menu a meal. Similarly one might say that to

Annette T. Rubinstein is the editor of MR Press book, *Schools Against Children: The Case for Community Control*, and the author of another MR Press book, *The Great Tradition in English Literature*.

call a school of education educational—well, it reminds me of the inspired statement I heard made by a professor at Teachers College some twenty-five years ago. She concluded a long lecture on the core curriculum by saying wistfully: “No matter how hard you try it’s almost impossible to do away with subject matter in mathematics.” The feat had apparently been achieved with no difficulty at all in most other subjects.

For most education courses the vacuum left by doing away with subject matter is, naturally, filled with jargon, and it is indeed a rare book in the field which has anything useful to say or sensible English with which to say it. It is therefore a pleasant surprise to open a volume such as Eleanor Leacock’s *Teaching and Learning in City Schools*. Written by a literate adult, it suggests several important ideas about teachers’ attitudes and procedures to other equally literate, if younger and less experienced, adults.

This book is the second in the series, “Psycho-social Studies in Education,” presented by the Bank Street College of Education. Perhaps the fact that Professor Leacock and the majority of her research team are anthropologists rather than education majors accounts for the fresh viewpoint and refreshing absence of pseudo-technical language.

Professor Leacock’s project was a study of the classroom attitudes of teachers in four different schools. They represented a working-class black, a lower-middle class black, a working-class white, and a middle-class white neighborhood. In all four schools the principals were asked to choose the second- and fifth-grade teachers whose classes they preferred to have observed. This insured a selection of those teachers whom the principals considered good, or at least satisfactory, so that the conduct of their classes might fairly be taken to represent attitudes and standards the school authorities as a whole approved.

The study included intensive classroom observation on three separate, widely spaced occasions by a team of two researchers, followed by two long tape-recorded personal interviews with each teacher, and finally a pre-tested questionnaire filled out after some preliminary discussion by 240 of the 268 children in the eight classes. Professor Leacock stresses the fact that the eight teachers observed—two black and six white—“were all experienced, hard-working and capable people who were trying to do their best for the children in their classrooms within the limits of their training and their situations. . . . The responsibility for the poor education cannot be laid at the door of the individual teacher

any more than poverty is the responsibility of the individual family."

As she also emphasizes, her purpose "is not so much to underscore inadequacies in the educational system as to clarify their nature through analyzing what teachers are trying to achieve in their classrooms."

The categories set up as relevant for the analysis of material secured primarily through classroom observation (the interviews served essentially to verify impressions and confirm or correct explanations already tentatively formulated by the observers) were:

1. The nature and clarity of the teacher's teaching concept, particularly with regard to the integration and development of curriculum content.
2. The depth, richness, and variety of the curriculum content.
3. The style of learning and thought being encouraged in the class.
4. The value content of classroom materials.
5. The relation of curriculum content to the children's experiences.

In addition to these methodological directives there were several consciously formulated, if tentative, assumptions, some of which the study tended to disprove. The most striking of these reversals dealt with the researchers' expectation that a major cause for learning difficulties in the low-income schools would be found in their teachers' tacit expectation of middle-class values and reactions from non-middle-class children. Professor Leacock learned, to her surprise, that this was not the problem, unless one includes in "middle-class values" the idea that lower-class children and their experiences are so unimportant as to be, in effect, non-existent. In two classrooms with "warm," "motherly," "friendly" teachers (one black and one white), "the children's very being, their existence as well as their contributions, were being consistently denied or undermined."

The denial began with the pictures, clippings, and other materials on the walls and bulletin boards, all featuring fair-haired, well-dressed children, WASP heroes, Nordic-looking suburban families, and so forth. "The only appearance of a dark-skinned person in any of the schools was on a chart entitled 'Slavery and the Civil War.'" But this visual denial was just the beginning. One second-grade teacher said enthusiastically that the readers ". . . have children with such lovely toys and mother is so sweet,

and they have a dog and a cat and go shopping. They have a real telephone, and a car, and they go to visit grandmother and grandfather who live on a farm." Questioned as to the possibility of a reader which would give a more realistic picture of the children's own experience, she replied that their experience was "so limited there's very little you can base a reader on. . . . Maybe [this one] will give them a few ideas on how they would like to live when they grow older."

Yet this too falls far short of measuring the full extent of the denial. Both the white middle-class fifth grade and the black lower-class fifth grade happened to have exceptionally skilled and devoted teachers. The former "spoke at great length about leadership when talking about classroom officers, monitors, and committees. . . . The other teacher could not even remember the name of the class treasurer." She said, in response to a question, that "there are no monitors," and that the most important thing for her children to learn was, "first of all, discipline. They should know that when an older person talks to them or gives a command they should respond."

In the first classroom a list of officers, monitors, and responsibilities was prominently displayed on the bulletin board; in the second, the only list so posted was in an envelope containing the names of children entitled to free lunches.

Professor Leacock is at pains to show that the sharp divergence between training for leadership and training for obedience is not the individual teacher's responsibility. She describes the pleasant relaxed atmosphere in the black classroom and the teacher's indignation that the assistant principal had one of her boys shine his shoes. She also reports a later comment on monitors: "I try to keep the monitorial down as much as I can because of the out-of-the-room business. On Wednesdays we are obliged to serve the office. I look around for a boy who is neat and clean."

But, kindly or unkindly, the point is made. One is reminded of the song taught in Victorian orphanages:

Though I am but poor and mean
I can teach the rich to love me
If I'm humble, neat, and clean
And submit when they reprove me.

In another exceptionally friendly and well-run classroom in a low-income black school, the fifth grade teacher, herself black, said that what she really wanted the children to learn was reading and arithmetic: "If they cannot count, what is going to happen when

they get out into the street? They will be short-changed so many times. . . . I feel that you will not lose any greatness by not knowing science, although that today is being stressed, but you will be able to make a living. So when I keep on saying reading and math I want you to understand why."

The acceptance of these minimum goals for (and, very soon, by) the poor black youngsters is most strikingly illustrated by a correlation of the children's intelligence (measured by IQ scores, unsatisfactory as these are) and the teachers' attitudes toward individual pupils. Before giving the detailed results in table form, Professor Leacock summarizes them:

In the middle-income white school the children toward whom the teacher felt most positive had an average IQ score some eleven points higher than those toward whom she felt negative. . . . This was not the case in the low-income Negro school. *Here the children about whom the teacher felt positive or neutral had an average IQ score almost ten points lower than those about whom she felt negative.* (Emphasis in the original)

For obvious reasons of economy I have used far more verbatim quotes, in proportion, than the book does. It relies chiefly on reports of specific classroom incidents and routines, given in some detail. These observations included not only mathematics, science, social studies, English, and other formal lessons, but also such periods as "recess," "milk and cookies," and so forth. Throughout the entire volume there are interesting reports of blackboard work, drills, student discussions, and other classroom experiences to illustrate and authenticate the conclusions formed by the team. (In one discussion of an arithmetic lesson and perhaps another of an English recitation, I did feel that the analysis ignored serious personal limitations to make its point of social differentiation, but these seemed to me the only questionable examples out of a surprisingly large number.)

I was also very much impressed by a number of other discussions not strictly related to the book's special orientation but profoundly relevant to teaching and learning in general. Two good examples are the survey of "Techniques of Classroom Management" (chapter four) and the discussion in chapter two of the three types of instruction which must be combined for good teaching in elementary schools.

The basic point in chapter four begins with a contrast between the sort of individual psychology offered (too often in an incredibly superficial manner) in schools of education and the

total absence of any psychological concern with group dynamics or methods of handling a class as a whole. There is much abstract discussion of "group climate" and "group participation" but no meaningful attempt to relate these concepts to the actual task of organizing and conducting a class. After discussing this lack, the chapter continues with a most perceptive and helpful examination of the specific methods used by a number of teachers—all at least minimally competent and successful—observed in the course of this study.

In the more general discussion of pedagogy Professor Leacock offers several illuminating descriptions of "three primary modes of teaching—that which gives practice in skills and factual knowledge, that which develops the ability to think systematically, and that which encourages free-floating, adventurous thinking and exploration of subjective experience."

Her succinct observations here, even where primarily intended for use in differentiating the approach to various classes, are most stimulating and would prove extraordinarily helpful to any intelligent young teacher anywhere.

She herself is, of course, well aware of the need for a general reform of our public educational system and of its inadequacy in helping to develop children of all classes. In her concluding pages she makes this concern explicit:

The importance of learning more about the world of working-class children and of building realities from their world into the curriculum have their counterpart in the more effective education of children generally. Concern is expressed that our "well-educated" children, too, are not that well-educated. . . . How can they be when they are so largely taught a myth—a myth for lower-income and middle-income children alike? Not only is the existence of this country's majority virtually denied in the classroom, but any "controversial" issue is avoided. The bland version of the world presented in the classroom contradicts reality, not only for lower-class children but middle-class children as well; it contradicts the personal reality of their own powerful emotional surges and the external reality of violence and seeming chaos that TV daily brings into their home. . . .

That history has developed through myriad actions by multitudes of people, a great many of whom were poor, is not told to children in their early years but is learned by those who go on to college, the vast majority of whom are *not* poor. The basic myth of the elementary classroom leads, not only to the denial of their existence for many children, but to a denial of the truth for all.

U.S. IMPERIALISM IN CANADA

By Martin Loney

Close the 49th Parallel Etc. Edited by Ian Lumsden. Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1970. 336 pp. \$3.75.

Some sixty years ago, Prime Minister Laurier declared that the Twentieth Century belongs to Canada. By the middle of the century it appeared that Canada belongs to the United States.

—Kari Levitt, Canadian economist

Ian Lumsden has brought together a collection of essays written predominantly by academics from eastern Canadian universities. In addition to the academics, three student radicals, one journalist, and Bruce Kidd, Canada's distance runner, are contributors. Many of the writers are activists on the left of the social democratic New Democratic Party, one is a national Vice President of the Party, another serves as a member of the Manitoba Legislative Assembly under North America's only social democratic government. Others range from Danny Drache, one of the founders of the University of Toronto-based "Canadian Liberation Movement," to George Martell, a free-school activist. Only a minority of the contributors could be described as Marxists.

From a variety of standpoints, the writers analyze the Canadian economy, labor movement, bourgeoisie, press, universities, sport, defense policies, culture, and even the Canadian student movement. Their criticism is telling and timely.

The inevitable integration of English Canada into the United States is a topic of serious discussion among many "responsible" public figures. This is not surprising, for at the economic level integration is already far advanced. By 1963, 60 per cent of Canadian manufacturing industry, 75 per cent of petroleum and natural gas, and 59 per cent of mining and smelting were under foreign, predominantly American, control.

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The bare statistics reveal only the tip of the iceberg. In fact, real penetration is even more extensive than these figures indicate. Geographical proximity facilitates trade between American parent and Canadian subsidiary. In 1964, these sales accounted for 61.2 per cent of U.S. manufacturing exports in Canada, where 31 per cent of U.S. foreign investment was located, but only 32 per cent of exports to Europe where 27 per cent of U.S. foreign investment was located. Devaluation of the Canadian dollar in 1962 was followed by a 17 per cent increase in sales from parents to subsidiaries. The Canadian automobile industry is so integrated into the American that, when in 1968 the industry partially defaulted in production under the auto pact agreement, the Canadian government surrendered \$80 million in customs duties, which it made no effort to recover for fear of disrupting the agreement.

The Canadian labor movement is dominated by American internationals which have successfully resisted attempts at Canadian control. The Canadian national sport, hockey, is dominated by the American National Hockey League. The largest circulation English-language periodical is *Time*. In 1961, the government's O'Leary report recommended disallowance, for tax purposes, of advertising in American magazines for sale in Canada. After direct intervention by Kennedy with Canadian Prime Minister Pearson, *Reader's Digest* and *Time* were exempted from forthcoming legislation. In addition, Canadian taxes now subsidize the annual postal costs of these two magazines by an estimated \$851,000 and \$725,000 respectively. American companies control most of Canadian newsstand distribution; inevitably they push the same magazines in Canada as in the States. The situation in the electronic media is equally bad. Canadians watch an overall preponderance of American TV programming.

Even the universities are no longer Canadian institutions. By 1968, an estimated 51 per cent of all university professors in Canada were foreign born. In the same year, foreigners received 86 per cent of new university appointments in Canada; 362 Canadians were appointed, compared to 1,013 Americans. In the United States, foreign university professors constitute only 2.5 per cent of all faculty.

In foreign policy, Canada is equally dependent. When ex-Prime Minister Pearson was asked to stop arms sales to the U.S. for use in the Vietnam War, he replied that no Canadian government could "contemplate with equanimity" an arms embargo to the United States. Under the Defense Production Sharing Agree-

ments, Canadian firms are permitted to bid on equal terms with U.S. firms for American war contracts. In 1965, these contracts already accounted for 30 per cent of all Canadian inedible end-product exports to the U.S. Not that exports provide the only rationale; since the origins of the Cold War the Canadian bourgeoisie has always identified with the American world view.

American control is on the increase. In 1968-1969 alone, 500 Canadian companies were taken over by American corporations. The recent cutback in the Canadian oil quota is part of an American campaign to force Canada to adopt a continental energy policy, the major thrust of which would be the sale of Canadian water to the United States. The last major water deal, the Columbia River Treaty, not only abrogated traditional Canadian rights, it also cost the Canadian taxpayer about \$100 million to give the Columbia away.

The wholesale takeover of the Canadian economy has not been without its problems for the Canadian ruling class for, along with the factories and resources, control over the economy has been lost. Cy Gonick, editor of *Canadian Dimension*, the major organ of the nationalist socialists, writes: "It is well known that Canada has never prospered in the face of a depression in the U.S. economy, has never been able to stabilize its prices in the face of American inflation, and has never been able to eliminate unemployment in the face of a downturn in the U.S. economy." Currently, in an unsuccessful effort to combat inflation, the government has raised the unemployment level to an official 6.5 per cent (February 1970) and a real level probably in excess of 8 per cent. The recession and the attempt to impose a government prices-and-incomes policy has exacerbated labor unrest. In the Canadian prairies, government action has been coupled with a failure in the wheat market which has seen the rapid growth of a radical Farmers' Union and escalated political protest. Canada's swinging millionaire Prime Minister may find his charisma insufficient to bring peace this time.

Hampered by its own lack of real control and its own continentalist views, the Canadian bourgeoisie—10 per cent French Canadian as compared to one third French Canadian in the population as a whole—has found itself both unable to comprehend or to deal with the growth of French Canadian nationalism in Quebec. So far Quebec has responded with demands for greater autonomy which, coupled with the balkanization which the predominant North-South economic ties have produced, has seri-

ously weakened Canadian federalism. It is quite probable that by the end of this decade, Quebec will have separated; and, with Quebec gone, the major cultural barrier to continental political integration will pass with it.*

The American takeover is accomplished with the aid of the usual myths—shortage of local entrepreneurial skills, lack of Canadian capital, lack of an adequate domestic market, etc. The myths can be exposed in the usual manner. Between 1960 and 1967, Canadian subsidiaries and affiliates sent one billion dollars more to their parent companies in the form of profits (two billion more if royalties, license, and management fees were included) than they received from them in the form of capital imports. Canadian entrepreneurship has either been absorbed in foreign corporations or increasingly pushed out of business by the stronger multinational corporations. An adequate market exists for most products and, in fact, American subsidiaries have proliferated through creating ten under-capacity companies in an industry where one would be rational.

The same dynamic documented so brilliantly by Andre Gunder Frank for Latin America is in operation in Canada. Internal consolidation and development occur most markedly when metropolitan links are weakened. The clearest example was the Canadian National Policy in the second half of the nineteenth century, which paved the way for the development of the Canadian West—and its exploitation by the central Canadian metropolises, Toronto and Montreal. The National Policy was developed as a last resort after the move to free trade by Britain and the failure of reciprocity with the United States. Impelled inwards onto its own resources, the Canadian nation was born.

Close the 49th Parallel Etc. not only describes much of the denationalization of Canadian business, labor, culture, and sport; it is also indicative of the growing movement to resist. At the same time, the book reflects the weaknesses of the English Canadian nationalist movement. Most of the contributors are self-professed socialists, yet the majority look to the takeover of Canada's ultra-

* The major political question in Quebec is not whether Quebec will separate but what political content will go with separatism. The strongest separatist force is the Parti Québécois, an electoral alliance of liberals, New Leftists, and some self-professed socialists. Of more interest to Marxists is the Front de Libération Populaire (FLP), formed to fight not only for independence but for socialist independence.

moderate, social democratic New Democratic Party as the major strategy for survival. There is apparently little awareness of the experience of other socialist groups working within social democratic parties; nor are the lessons which can be learned from the NDP's experiences as a provincial government explored. The decisive financial voice and voting strength within the NDP lies in the hands of the oligarchic international unions.

The "Waffle" group, organized around a nationalist socialist program, succeeded in gaining nearly a third of the votes at the last NDP convention—few of them from labor. They may ultimately—as the British Labor Left did for a brief period—gain control of the convention, only to find that as their leadership is co-opted, real power in the party remains elusive.

The resurgence of Canadian nationalism has been mainly concentrated among academics and some of the professional middle classes. The Canadian New Left largely followed and imitated the development of the American New Left. Indeed, as one of the contributors points out, it sometimes did so to such an extent that it failed to have anything relevant to say to Canadians. Even now it is certainly not in the vanguard of the new nationalism. There is an increasing concern about Americanization at all levels, partly as a consequence of the growing take-over of the Canadian economy, partly as a reaction to the murder of the American dream and the growing chaos and repression in America.

One danger, which Andre Gunder Frank drew attention to in his address to the 1968 Havana Cultural Congress, should be mentioned, namely, that in focusing on imperialism as the enemy, Canadian socialists may fail to direct the struggle against the local class enemy. If they do, they will ignore the anti-capitalist traditions of important sections of the working class, and in the battle to win an independent Canada will fail to pinpoint imperialism's weakest links—its local collaborators. Unless the struggle for an independent Canada is made primarily anti-capitalist and socialist, the movement will remain predominantly one of intellectuals. If class politics are placed where they belong, in the vanguard of the movement, then the rebirth of Canadian nationalism may continue to galvanize the forces for a Canadian revolution.

Alternatively, perhaps as others would argue and even some of the contributors to this book seem prepared to concede, the national battle is already lost. In that case, the task of a Canadian

socialist should be to continue the anti-capitalist struggle, looking this time to a continental perspective. Nationalism is, after all, not a fundamental principle but only a tactic in the long struggle for international socialism.

Close the 49th Parallel Etc. provides excellent documentation on American imperialism in Canada. It is now necessary for Canadian socialists to have a much more thorough debate on strategies for opposition.

American imperialism in CANADA?

Although American imperialism is generally believed to hinder development mainly in Latin America and Asia, it is a fact that the development of Canada has been hindered by Canada's assigned role as a resource base and consumer market within the American Empire.

The result of this role: glaring regional disparities, political disintegration, the reduction of the French-Canadian province of Quebec to an impoverished colony within a colony.

If you are interested in learning about Canada and American attempts to absorb her economically and politically, read CANADIAN DIMENSION, Canada's socialist magazine.

Some recent articles in CANADIAN DIMENSION:

Dunlop: What Price Imperialism?

Canada's Role in Fighting Communism with Germs

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WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

Whither the Three Super-Powers?

Powerful nations and empires compete: for territory, resources, productivity, prestige, allies, leadership. This competition is called power politics.

Spokesmen for each powerful nation seek to defend and promote national interests at home and abroad, twenty-four hours a day, three hundred sixty-five days in the year. If possible they proceed peacefully, through diplomatic give-and-take. When diplomacy fails to gain their objectives, diplomats first threaten and then use violence.

Success or failure in the game of power politics is determined by the outcome of one or more military free-for-alls in which great powers take sides and fight until one side proclaims victory and the other side admits defeat.

Wars from 1914 to 1918 and from 1939 to 1945 were the two most recent examples of trial-by-battle between great powers. Half a dozen European powers lined up for war in 1914. Twenty-five years later, the same European powers, minus Austria-Hungary and plus the United States and Japan, lined up for a second round of battles. After four years of wholesale destruction and mass murder, Marshal Smuts of South Africa predicted, in 1943, that only two great powers would survive the war: the United States and the Soviet Union.

General Smuts proved to be right. War's end in 1945 revealed a two-power world. Four years later, however, a third power entered the field, when the People's Republic of China was proclaimed. On October 1, 1949, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, the earth's most populous nation, occupying a strategic position on the earth's largest continent, demanded entrance to the very exclusive circle of competitors for planet-wide power.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union welcomed

the interloper. Reaction in the United States was hard-boiled and belligerent. After Chinese "volunteers" pushed their way into the Korean War, People's China was blacklisted as Enemy Number One, blockaded and, under insistent Washington leadership, excluded from the United Nations.

Forty years earlier, Winston Churchill had tried his hand at strangling the infant Soviet Republic in its cradle. After 1949, John Foster Dulles as United States Secretary of State made a similar attempt to dispose of the People's Republic of China. Both murder plots failed.

The Soviet Union collaborated with People's China for a decade, then, in 1960, relations between Moscow and Peking became more strained. As Mao's Proletarian Cultural Revolution assumed the proportions of a bid for world leadership, the Moscow-Peking antagonism reached the level of vituperative denunciation, severed diplomatic relations, and led to military clashes along the Soviet-Chinese frontiers in Manchuria. The Soviet Union, like the United States, refused to recognize the People's Republic of China as a bona fide contender in the struggle for world power.

Mao won his bid for power inside China by defeating and humiliating his opponents in the Communist Party and the trade unions. He then turned to world politics. As one of the three super-powers he could coexist, cooperate, or fight. Faced with Washington's policy of non-recognition and denunciation as Enemy Number One, Mao had a simple choice: accept the Dulles policy of encirclement and rebuild China in a way acceptable to the United States, or reject subordination and prepare for war. Mao chose the second alternative and pushed his military preparations. His decision was the logical answer of a super-power threatened with encirclement by the armed forces of a better-armed rival which was pushing its way in Southeast Asia.

In 1970 the list of great world powers remains what it was at the end of the Korean War in 1953. It contains three names: the United States, the Soviet Union, People's China. Three major powers are competing for territory, resources, productivity, prestige, allies and leadership.

Uncle Sam as World Policeman

Membership in the exclusive Club of World Powers was reduced from half a dozen (all European) in 1910, to one in 1945, when Uncle Sam bestrode the planet with a monopoly of the atom bomb, with a near-monopoly of the planet's gold reserve, with a wide margin over all other nations in productivity, with huge war profits in its treasure chests, with dominance in the air and on the seas.

Great Britain, which had played world policeman during much of the nineteenth century, was forced to dismantle her empire and resign from the policing job. Who was to take over?

Informed opinion took it for granted that decades must elapse before the Soviet Union could recover from its shattering war losses, learn to make atom bombs, and develop an economy capable of challenging that of the United States. Manifest destiny seemed to be calling the United States Oligarchy to assume the mantle of world leadership.

Did the American Oligarchy have the qualifications necessary for taking over world leadership and holding it? For this job there were four prerequisites:

(1) Someone or some group in the Oligarchy must have a vision of the American Century and a practical program for realizing it. The project must have behind it the considered support of the Oligarchy as a whole.

(2) Successful world leadership depended upon a large, skilled, experienced, dedicated civil-service personnel.

(3) The idea of world leadership must be sold to the American people—particularly to the generation that was attending high school during the 1950s and 1960s.

(4) The insular position of the United States in the Western Hemisphere made Washington's world leadership dependent upon a considerable number of tried and true allies in Europe and Asia.

The technical capacity to carry out such a project might be suggested in text books and hinted at in university courses,

but it must be tempered and tested through generations in the tough practice of power politics.

It goes without saying that a high level of productivity, surplus wealth, and adequate weaponry are the means through which world leadership can be established and maintained. Productivity, wealth, and military hardware are the instruments of power. To be effective they must be wielded by people.

Many voices had hailed the United States as world leader during the difficult years that followed war's end in 1918. Two decades of experience with Americans as world policy makers aroused anti-American criticism. After 1945 the disillusion with America and Americans was even more extensive because of the wide economic gap that separated the United States, especially from the awakening Third World.

The world of 1970 has had twenty-five years in which to learn by bitter experience the insatiate appetite of United States big business; the fumbling backwardness of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon; and the fate that awaits any president with the imagination and initiative of John F. Kennedy. Policy makers who are anti-Soviet, anti-Chinese, anti-Cuban, anti-progress, pro-reaction will find little support in a world caught in the throes of a general social revolution.

Success in the exercise of world authority will always presuppose imagination, adaptability, generalship. Revolutionary change demands an additional skill—to move along with the changing times. For better or worse, American public opinion is firmly anchored in the eighteenth century, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights. Essentially it stands or falls with the disintegrating bourgeois-fascist pattern of life.

The first essential for the exercise of power is a vision of what might be done, plus a program for achieving possible objectives. With unimportant exceptions, the members of the American Oligarchy and their advisers have been concerned with money-making and election returns. In terms of world politics they have had little world vision, less world understanding, and even less world experience.

The American Oligarchy was never united behind an

American Century program. Literally, such a program hardly existed. It was mentioned and advocated but never worked out in strategic and tactical detail.

Since there was no accepted program to implement the American Century, there was nothing concrete to put before the American people. The overall problems of attaining and maintaining an American Century were barely discussed beyond the closed circles of diplomacy and higher education.

The proof of the pudding? Almost complete ignorance of empire-building as a science and an art, unawareness of the obvious fact that the second half of the present century is witnessing the liquidation rather than the building of empires; a naive assumption that handouts of money and arms would meet all requirements; a negative attitude toward the technological and social revolutions that were sweeping the planet in the 1950s and 1960s; failure to come to grips with underdevelopment in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; the obsolete idea that youth would continue to accept the leadership of uninformed and crabbed old age.

The American Oligarchy's failure to deal adequately with the problems of world leadership can be gauged by the revolt of youth at home, rising anti-Americanism abroad, the fumbling stupidities in Korea, the mistakes regarding Cuba, and the ghastly and ruinous war years in Southeast Asia.

Day after day evidence continues to pile up that demonstrates the incapacity of the American Oligarchy to deal meaningfully with the problems of world leadership. Like many another dog, the American Oligarchy had had its day and has proved itself incapable of dealing with the task which present-day world leadership imposes. Unable to make the necessary grades, the American Oligarchy, like its British predecessor in the previous generation, will have no choice but to become a dropout from the ranks of the super-powers.

Such a development will throw the burdens of world leadership upon the Soviet Union and People's China—in a world which has not yet gone socialist, but in which the chief exponents of socialism are the dominant super-powers. It seems likely that a West Germany controlled by the Social Democrats

might collaborate in such a development, and that only token resistance will be offered by Japan.

Six Issues Confronting World Leaders

As the American Empire crumbles within and bleeds itself white in its current effort to exploit Asian resources and manpower for the profit of Western monopoly capital, several urgent problems clamor for the attention of world leaders.

(1) First in immediacy is the avoidance of a nuclear war. The Near East and Middle East are a chronic tinderbox. Military clashes have disrupted the life of the region through most of 1970. With major powers ranged on either side, the local war will escalate to larger proportions unless some agreement can be reached. Only less threatening is the endemic warfare in Southeast Asia.

(2) As arms spending mounts, the power of the military grows. If general war is to be avoided the military must be subordinated to civil authority.

(3) Peoples living in backward areas are demanding not only the right of self-determination, but also United Nations guarantees that will ensure economic adequacy and social justice in accordance with the U.N. Charter and the Declaration of the Rights of Man.

(4) Basic to any stabilization and improvement of international relations is the inauguration of effective planetwide planning and coordination under a world government exercising sufficient delegated authority to create a body of world law and take responsibility for its enforcement.

(5) Equally basic is the conservation and scientific use of the natural environment. Not only must pollution be ended but the riches of nature must be made available to all on reasonably equal terms.

(6) A working adjustment between population increase and the available means of subsistence must be established.

These six areas of world concern exist without regard for national, regional, or local differences. They constitute a minimum program of international research and action that commands the attention of any world authority.

(Continued from inside front cover)

Ahmad El Kodsý and Eli Lobel (\$6.00). *Vietnam: The Endless War*, by Paul M. Sweezy, Leo Huberman, and Harry Magdoff (\$5.95). *Europe vs. America: Contradictions of Imperialism*, by Ernest Mandel (\$5.50). *Revolution in Guinea: Selected Texts of Amílcar Cabral*, edited by Richard Handyside (\$4.95). *Politics and Social Structure in Latin America*, by James Petras (\$9.50). *Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader*, edited by Robert I. Rhodes (\$11.95). *A Survey of Chemical and Biological Warfare*, by John Cookson and Judith Nottingham (\$9.75). *Lenin Today: Eight Essays on the Hundredth Anniversary of Lenin's Birth*, edited by Paul M. Sweezy and Harry Magdoff (\$5.00).

New paperback books: *Marxist Economic Theory*, by Ernest Mandel (2 vols., \$7.90 the set). *Corporations and the Cold War*, edited by David Horowitz (\$2.95). *China Shakes the World*, by Jack Belden, introduction by Owen Lattimore (\$3.95). *Racism and the Class Struggle: Further Pages from a Black Worker's Notebook*, by James Boggs (\$2.45). *The Hidden History of the Korean War*, by I. F. Stone (\$3.95). *Schools Against Children: The Case for Community Control*, edited by Annette T. Rubinstein (\$3.45). *The Arab World and Israel*, by Ahmad El Kodsý and Eli Lobel (\$2.25). *The Myth of Black Capitalism*, by Earl Ofari (\$1.95). *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution*, by Andre Gunder Frank (\$3.95). *Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader*, edited by Robert I. Rhodes (\$3.95).

Unfortunately, a number of errors crept into the text and tables of last month's Review of the Month ("The Long-Run Decline in Liquidity"): Page 1, third line from bottom of text—"1960-1967" should read "1966-1967"

Page 6, Table 2—in line (6) the figure for 1965 is 98.2 instead of 88.2, and for 1969 it is 133.3 instead of 143.3; in line (8) the figure for 1965 is 20.8 instead of 18.6, and for 1969 it is 21.2 instead of 22.8

Page 7, Table 3—in column (2) the figure for 1946 is 51.9 instead of 71.9

Page 7, third line from bottom of text—"360 percent" should read "540 percent"

As will be readily apparent, none of these errors has any bearing on the meaning or interpretation of the article in question.

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